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ABSTRACT	  
	  This	  study	  analyzes	  the	  performance	  of	  different	  dividend	  yield	  strategies	  against	  the	  S&P	  500	  index.	  Time	  period	  for	  the	  study	  is	  from	  the	  year	  2001	  to	  the	  year	  2017.	  Dividend	  yield	  strategies	  used	  in	  the	  study	  are	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Dogs	  of	  the	  Dow’	   strategies,	   where	   investor	   chooses	   the	   top	   10	   highest	   dividend	   yield	  companies	  (DoD–10)	  from	  an	  index	  and	  holds	  the	  equally	  balanced	  portfolio	  for	  one	  year.	  Additionally,	  the	  DoD–5,	  where	  investor	  chooses	  from	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  the	  five	  cheapest	  stocks	  and	  holds	  them	  for	  one	  year,	  and	  the	  DoD–1,	  where	  investor	  chooses	  from	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  the	  second	  least	  expensive	  stock	  and	  holds	  it	  for	  one	  year,	  strategies	  are	  examined.	  	  The	  performance	  of	  the	  portfolios	  are	  analyzed	  on	  absolute	  and	  risk–adjusted	  bases.	  Market–adjustment	   model	   and	   ‘Modigliani–squared’–adjustment	   are	   used	   to	  measure	  abnormal	  returns,	  and	  for	  the	  risk–adjustments	  both	  the	  Sharpe	  ratio	  and	  Treynor	   index	   are	   used.	   Tax	   and	   transaction	   costs	   are	   also	   calculated	   for	  economically	  accurate	  results.	  Finally,	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  are	  tested	  against	  market	  downturns.	  	  	  	  	  The	  empirical	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  clearly	  outperform	  the	  market	  index.	  The	  average	  annual	  abnormal	  return	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  is	  15.9	  %,	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  21.6	  %	  and	  for	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio	  35.6	  %.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  annual	  returns	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  Returns	  analyzed	  on	  monthly	  basis	  show	  statistical	  significance	  and	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  outperforming	  the	  market.	  After	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  returns	  analyzed	  on	  both	  annual	  and	  monthly	  basis	  are	  still	  positive,	  and	  only	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	   is	  statistically	  significant	  on	  monthly	  basis.	  Finally,	  this	  study	  provides	  information	  that	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  cope	  extremely	  well	  during	  market	  downturns.	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1.	  INTRODUCTION	  	  Investors	  and	  academics	  are	  constantly	  trying	  to	  examine	  how	  to	  beat	  the	  market	  by	  using	  and	  testing	  different	  investment	  strategies.	  Some	  of	  those	  strategies	  have	  worked	  rather	  well,	  while	  others	  have	  not	  proved	  to	  be	  effective.	  Some	  strategies	  work	  well	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  and	  others	  strive	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  The	  high	  dividend	  yield	  strategy	  has	  been	  regularly	  reported	  by	  the	  financial	  press,	  partially	  because	  of	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2008	  and	  the	  recession	  followed	  by	  it.	  The	  high	  dividend	  yield	  strategy	  received	  a	   lot	  of	  media	  coverage	  as	   the	  stock	  prices	  went	  down	  so	  rapidly	  and	  investors	  tried	  to	  find	  safe	  havens	  for	  their	  investments.	  Main	  reason	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  behavior	  might	  be	  in	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  the	  high	  dividend	  yield	   companies.	  Alternatively,	   it	  might	  be	  driven	  by	   the	  price–to–price	   feedback	  model,	  where	  speculative	  prices	  go	  up,	  creating	  successes	  for	  some	  investors	  and	  more	  word–of–mouth	  enthusiasm	  and	  others	  will	  expect	  the	  prices	  to	  increase	  even	  more.	   Price–to–price	   feedback	  model	   also	  makes	   investors	   bid	   up	   prices	   against	  each	  other	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  the	  speculative	  bubbles.	  (Shiller	  2003.)	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  dividend	  yield	  strategies	  is	  the	  “Dogs	  of	  the	  Dow”	  (DoD).	  The	  DoD	  strategy	  is	  so	  simple	  that	  many	  investors	  assume	  it	  could	  not	  create	  abnormal	  returns.	  The	  DoD	  is	  a	  contrarian	  value–oriented	  investment	  strategy,	  which	  was	  found	  by	  John	  Slatter	  and	  published	  in	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  by	  Dorfman	  in	  August	  1988.	  Slatter	  states	  that	  you	  can	  find	  out	  favor	  stocks	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  stocks’	  dividend	  yields.	  Dividend	   yield	   can	   be	   calculated	   by	   dividing	   annual	   dividend	   by	   the	   underlying	  stock	  price	  at	  a	  certain	  time.	  	  (1)	   𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑	  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 	  𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘	  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 	   	  	  If	   the	   dividend	   yield	   is	  high,	   it	   is	  usually	   a	   signal	   that	   the	   stock’s	  price	   has	   gone	  downward	  while	  the	  stock’s	  dividend	  remains	  at	  the	  same	  level.	  High	  dividend	  yield	  includes	  certain	  information:	  	  	   1.	  High	  dividend	  yield	  is	  a	  result	  from	  a	  recent	  stock	  price	  decline.	  
	  Out–of–favor	  stocks	  decline	  significantly	  over	  certain	  time,	  which	   leads	  to	  higher	  dividend	  yields.	  Companies	   that	   are	  experiencing	   financial	  difficulties	   could	  even	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have	  excessively	  high	  dividend	  yields.	  For	  example,	  dividend	  yield	  for	  a	  large	  global	  insurance	   company	  XL	  Group	  was	  20.54	  %	  at	   the	  end	  of	  2008.	  Their	  stock	  price	  declined	  during	  the	   financial	  crisis	  quite	  significantly,	   from	  January	  year	  2007	  to	  January	  year	  2008	  from	  $	  69.96	  to	  $	  29.55,	  and	  in	  the	  start	  of	  the	  year	  2009	  it	  was	  only	  $	  5.46.	  	  	  	   2.	  High	  dividend	  yield	  is	  the	  dividend	  policy	  of	  the	  company.	  	  Statement	   means	   that	   companies	   that	   are	   paying	   dividends	   are	   wealthy,	   large	  companies	  who	  want	  to	  reward	  their	  shareholders	  with	  annual	  payments.	  The	  stock	  prices	  of	  those	  wealthy	  and	  large	  companies	  are	  higher	  and	  less	  volatile,	  thus	  the	  dividend	  yields	  are	  not	  excessively	  high,	  yet	  stable.	  These	  two	  points	  shows	  that	  the	  motive	  for	  investing	  in	  stocks	  with	  high	  dividend	  yields	  could	  be	  that	  after	  a	  stock	  price	  decline	  the	  stock	  is	  slightly	  more	  likely	  to	  rise	  in	  the	  next	  quartile,	  or	  investors	  want	  to	  earn	  a	  stable	  and	  sustainable	  return	  on	  their	  investment.	  	  The	  formation	  of	  a	  DoD	  portfolio	  is	  relatively	  easy	  and	  straightforward	  (Dorfman	  1988):	  	   1.   Calculate	  the	  dividend	  yields	  of	  all	  the	  stocks	  in	  the	  index	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  2.   Rank	  dividend	  yields	  to	  order	  and	  identify	  the	  top	  10	  dividend	  yield	  stocks.	  3.   Buy	  the	  10	  stocks	  in	  equal	  cash	  amounts	  or	  equally	  weight	  them	  in	  portfolio	  containing	  the	  10	  stocks.	  4.   	  Hold	  the	  portfolio	  for	  one	  year.	  5.   After	  one	  year	  redo	  the	  list	  and	  sell	  the	  stocks,	  which	  are	  not	  in	  the	  top	  10	  and	  buy	  those,	  which	  are	  in	  top	  10	  again	  in	  equal	  amounts.	  	  6.   Repeat	  steps	  4–5,	  as	  long	  as	  you	  will.	  	  	  Dow	   Jones	   Industrial	  Average’s	   (DJIA)	  blue–chip	   stocks	  often	   rise	  promptly	  after	  being	  out	  of	  favor	  when	  investors’	  minds	  change.	  Slatter	  examined	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  DoD	  strategy	  over	  period	  of	  1972	  to	  1987	  in	  the	  U.S.	  stock	  market	  and	  found	  out	  that	  the	  strategy	  outperformed	  DJIA	  index	  by	  7.6	  %	  on	  annual	  basis.	  (Dorfman	  1988.)	  After	  Slatter’s	  contribution,	  there	  have	  been	  numerous	  of	  different	  articles,	  books	   and	   researches	   investigating	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   rather	   simple	  investment	   strategy.	   The	  DoD	  has	   become	  more	   popular	   by	  Barry	   (1993),	   Barry	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(1994)	  and	  O’Higgins	  and	  Downes	  (1991).	  The	  main	  idea	  in	  the	  strategy	  is	  that	  the	  dividend	  yield	  is	  often	  an	  inverse	  indicator	  of	  popularity,	  and	  that	  choosing	  stocks	  that	  are	  briefly	  out	  of	  favor	  can	  create	  an	  opportunity	  to	  beat	  the	  market.	  	  	  Nowadays,	  the	  DoD	  strategy	  occurs	  in	  different	  forms.	  The	  three	  most	  popular	  ones	  are	  (O’Higgins	  and	  Downes	  1991):	  	   1.   The	  “Dogs	  of	  the	  Dow”	  (DoD).	  	  2.   The	  “Puppies	  of	  the	  Dow”	  (PoD).	  3.   The	  “Penultimate	  Profit	  Prospect”	  (PPP).	  	  The	  PoD	  strategy,	  also	  known	  for	  the	  High	  Yield	  5	  strategy	  or	  the	  Flying	  Five	  means	  that	  investor	  buys	  only	  the	  five	  highest	  dividend	  yielding	  stocks	  of	  the	  DoD	  strategy,	  which	  are	  also	  the	  five	  cheapest	  ones.	  The	  PoD	  strategy	  is	  built	  on	  value	  investing,	  and	   it	  benefits	   from	  investors’	  mind	  changes,	  as	   then	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  buy	  stocks,	  which	   are	   currently	   out	   of	   favor	   at	   bargain	   prices.	   The	   PPP	   strategy	   selects	   the	  second	  least	  expensive	  stock	  from	  the	  PoD	  portfolio.	  The	  reason	  why	  not	  to	  choose	  the	  least	  expensive	  is	  that	  it	  may	  be	  troubled	  company	  that	  should	  be	  avoided.	  This	  type	  of	  strategy	   is	  rather	  too	  risky	  when	  all	  your	  assets	  are	   invested	   in	  only	  one	  stock.	  (O’Higgins	  and	  Downes	  2000.)	  	  The	  PoD	  and	  the	  PPP	  strategy	  have	  been	  tested	  between	  years	  1973	  and	  1991,	  and	  during	  that	  time	  the	  PoD	  beat	  DJIA	  index	  by	  9.0	  %	  and	  the	  PPP	  beat	  the	  DJIA	  index	  by	  13.98	  %.	  Both	  strategies	  work	  in	  the	  same	  way	  time	  wise	  as	  the	  DoD:	  hold	  the	  same	  stock	  or	  stocks	  for	  one	  calendar	  year,	  then	  rebalance	  the	  portfolio	  and	  start	  again.	  (Wunder	  and	  Mayo	  1995.)	  	  Academics	  have	  proposed	  possible	  explanations	  for	  the	  outperformance	  of	  dividend	  yield	  strategies.	  O’Higgins	  and	  Downes	  (1991)	  state	  that	  after	  the	  1970s	  there	  was	  more	  institutional	  investors	  than	  before.	  When	  the	  year	  or	  quarter	  was	  near	  to	  end,	  institutional	   investors	   sold	   the	   worst	   stocks,	   so	   that	   they	   could	   show	   to	   their	  customers	   only	   the	   stocks	   that	  were	   performing	   well.	   This	   phenomenon	   is	   also	  called	  as	  “window	  dressing”.	  	  	  	  1.1.	  Purpose	  of	  the	  study	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Purpose	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   find	   out	  how	  different	   dividend	   yield	   strategies	   cope	  against	  the	  Standard	  &	  Poor’s	  500	  (S&P	  500)	  stock	  index	  during	  the	  years	  2001–2017.	   The	   S&P	   500	   stock	   index	   includes	   companies,	   which	   are	   traded	   in	   some	  significant	   U.S.	   based	   stock	   exchange,	   e.g.	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange	   (NYSE)	   or	  NASDAQ.	  The	  S&P	  500	  index	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  financial	  literature	  and	  often	  regarded	  as	  the	  most	  suitable	  single	  measure	  of	  large–gap	  U.S.	  equities	  and	  an	  appropriate	  proxy	   for	   the	  market.	  There	   is	  over	  $	  7.8	  trillion	  benchmarked	  to	  the	   index,	  with	  index	   assets	   totaling	   roughly	   $	   2.2	   trillion	   of	   this	   total.	   The	   index	   includes	   500	  leading	   companies	   and	   seizes	   roughly	   80	   %	   coverage	   of	   available	   market	  capitalization.	   (S&P	   Dow	   Jones	   Indices	   LLC	   2018.)	   The	   different	   dividend	   yield	  strategies,	  which	  will	  be	  tested	  against	  the	  S&P	  500	  are	  the	  DoD	  (DoD–10),	  the	  PoD	  (DoD–5)	  and	  the	  PPP	  (DoD–1).	  	  The	  performances	  of	  the	  dividend	  yield	  strategies	  will	  be	  analyzed	  on	  both	  absolute	  and	   risk	  adjusted	  bases.	  The	   risk	  adjustment	  will	  be	  done	  with	  market–adjusted	  model	  and	  the	  ‘Modigliani–squared’–adjusted	  model.	  In	  addition,	  standard	  portfolio	  performance	  measures	  of	  Sharpe	  (1966)	  and	  Treynor	  (1965)	  will	  be	  used	  for	  risk–adjustments	  for	  the	  DoD	  strategies.	  	  	  The	  timeframe	  for	  the	  data	  in	  this	  study	  is	  from	  the	  year	  2001	  to	  the	  year	  2017.	  This	  timeframe	   creates	   different	   business	   cycles	   and	  market	   conditions.	   Period	   after	  financial	   crisis	   in	   2007	   has	   put	   investors	   on	   the	   alert,	   and	   investing	   in	   value	  companies	   that	   can	   offer	   dividends	  might	   be	   safer	   bet,	   than	   to	   invest	   in	   growth	  companies.	  	  	  Dividend	  yield	  investment	  strategies	  have	  been	  under	  many	  academics’	  scope	  over	  the	  years;	  however,	  the	  PoD	  strategy	  has	  not	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  in	  those	  studies.	  The	  PoD	  strategy	  has	  usually	  been	  a	  side	  product	  of	  the	  larger	  and	  more	  explored	  DoD	  strategy.	  In	  this	  study,	  also	  the	  PoD	  will	  be	  analyzed	  and	  tested	  as	  intensively	  as	  the	  regular	  DoD	  strategy.	  	  	  With	  this	  thesis	  the	  research	  gap	  of	  picking	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  from	  a	  large	  index	  like	  S&P	  500	  will	  be	  addressed.	  Many	  previous	  researches	  have	  concentrated	  only	  on	   the	   top	   10	   DoD	   stocks	   rather	   than	   the	   top	   5	   or	   top	   1.	   In	   this	   thesis	   the	  concentration	   is	   equally	   divided	   to	   all	   three	   DoD	   portfolios.	   The	   time	   period	  contains	  the	  time	  after	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  best	  of	  author’s	  knowledge	  this	  is	   the	   first	   time	  that	   the	  DoD	  strategies	  have	  been	  tested	   in	  time	  period	  after	   the	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financial	  crisis,	  and	  when	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  are	  chosen	  from	  the	  S&P	  500	   index.	  Previous	  studies	  have	  concentrated	  more	  on	  smaller	  indices	  and	  to	  the	  U.S.	  markets	  rather	  than	  on	  other	  markets.	  Consistently,	  due	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  S&P	  500	  index,	   this	   study	   will	   also	   concentrate	   on	   the	   U.S.	   markets.	   In	   addition	   to	   U.S.	  markets,	  dividend	  yield	  strategies	  have	  been	  researched	  in	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  Poland	   (Brzeszczyński	   and	  Gajdka	   2009),	   United	  Kingdom	   (Filbeck	   and	  Visscher	  1997)	  and	  (Ap	  Gwilym,	  Seaton	  and	  Thomas	  2005),	  Canada	  (Filbeck	  and	  Visscher	  2003),	  Latin	  America	  (Da	  Silva	  2001)	  and	  in	  Finland	  (Rinne	  and	  Vähämaa	  2011).	  	  	  1.2.	  Research	  hypotheses	  	  The	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  analyzed	   and	   introduced	  more	   specifically	   in	   chapter	   six	  under	  the	  data	  and	  methodology	  part.	  The	  hypotheses	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  summary	  and	  conclusions	  chapter	  and	  it	  is	  evaluated	  whether	  they	  are	  accepted	  or	  rejected.	  	   H6:	  The	  DoD	  portfolios’	  returns	  exceed	  the	  market	  return	  on	  both	  risk–adjusted	  and	  absolute	  bases.	  H7:	  The	  DoD	  portfolios’	  returns	  exceed	  the	  market	  return	  after	  	  transaction	  costs	  and	  tax–adjustments.	  H8:	  The	  DoD	  portfolios	  outperform	  index	  in	  market	  downturns.	  	  	  1.3.	  Structure	  of	  the	  study	  	  The	  structure	  of	  this	  study	  goes	  as	  follows.	  First	  chapter	  is	  the	  introduction	  chapter,	  which	  provides	  background	  information	  about	  the	  topic	  and	  gives	  brief	  introduction	  of	   the	   research	   problem.	   The	   second	   chapter	   explains	   the	   Efficient	   Market	  Hypothesis	  and	  more	  precisely	  the	  market	  efficiency	  and	  its	  three	  different	  forms	  created	  by	  Fama	  (1965).	  Chapter	  number	  three	  presents	  and	  explains	  some	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  anomalies	  that	  occur	  in	  the	  stock	  markets.	  After	  that,	  chapter	  four	  will	  discuss	  the	  dividend	  puzzle	  and	  different	  relationships	  between	  dividend	  yields	  and	   stock	   returns.	   Chapter	   five	   is	   about	   fundamentals	   of	   portfolio	  management,	  models	  and	  basic	   formulas	   that	   are	  used	   in	   finance	   literature	  and	  articles.	  These	  chapters	  are	  the	  theoretical	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	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Last	  chapters	  compose	  the	  empirical	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	  The	  data	  and	  methodology	  that	   are	   used	   in	   the	   research	   are	   introduced	   in	   chapter	   six.	   Additionally,	   the	  hypotheses	  of	  this	  study	  are	  presented	  in	  chapter	  six.	  Chapter	  seven	  presents	  and	  discusses	   the	   empirical	   results	   of	   the	   study,	   and	   the	   last	   chapter	   number	   eight	  summarizes	  the	  results	  and	  concludes	  this	  thesis.	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2.	  MARKET	  EFFICIENCY	  	  As	   stated	  earlier,	   investors	  and	  academics	  are	   trying	   to	   find	  out	  how	   to	  beat	   the	  market	  and	  usually	  the	  market	  efficiency	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  beating	  the	  market	  is	  so	  challenging.	  Fama	  (1970:	  383)	  states	  that	  a	  market,	  where	  all	  the	  prices	  are	  fully	  reflecting	  available	  information	  can	  be	  called	  as	  an	  efficient	  market.	  When	  market	  is	  efficient,	   the	   available	   information	   is	   incorporated	   with	   the	   prices,	   and	   at	   the	  market,	   there	   are	   great	   number	   of	   participants	   that	   are	   constantly	   pricing	   the	  market.	  When	  participants	  are	  selling,	  or	  buying	  assets,	  prices	  quickly	  incorporate	  with	  the	  new	  information.	  The	   fundamental	  role	  of	  capital	  markets	   is	   to	  relocate	  funds	  between	  borrowers	  and	  lenders.	  	  The	  informational	  part	  of	  efficiency	  is	  important	  to	  stock	  prices	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  Firstly,	  investors	  are	  seeking	  for	  the	  best	  possible	  trading	  strategy	  as	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  beat	  the	  market,	  and	  secondly,	  if	  the	  stock	  prices	  are	  precisely	  reflecting	  all	  the	  available	   information,	   investors	   know	   that	   their	   investment	   capital	   goes	   to	   its	  highest–valued	  use.	  Fama	  (1991)	  notes	  that	  market	  efficiency	  is	  a	  continuum.	  The	  lower	   the	   transaction	   costs	  are	   in	  a	   capital	  market,	   the	  more	  efficient	   the	   capital	  market	  is.	  Costs	  of	  the	  capital	  market	  include	  for	  example	  obtaining	  the	  information	  and	  trading	  costs.	  	  The	  meaning	  of	  efficient	  market	  is	  extremely	  important	  to	  understand	  because	  it	  is	  essentially	  the	  base	  of	  all	  investment	  theories.	  If	  markets	  are	  not	  efficient,	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  to	  gain	  abnormal	  returns,	  which	  occurs	  when	  securities	  prices	  are	  not	  reflecting	   all	   the	   available	   information.	   Gaining	   abnormal	   returns	   from	   financial	  markets	  are	  called	  anomalies.	  Different	  anomalies	  will	  be	  more	  widely	  explained	  in	  chapter	   three.	   This	   chapter	   gives	   an	   overview	   of	   market	   efficiency.	   Firstly,	   the	  efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  is	  presented	  and	  along	  with	  a	  few	  articles,	  which	  opens	  the	  topic	  more	  widely.	  Secondly,	  different	  forms	  of	  market	  efficiency	  will	  be	  listed	  and	   explained	   through	   different	   examples	   and	   articles,	  which	   have	   analyzed	   the	  forms	  in	  different	  situations.	  	  	  	  2.1.	  Efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  	  Efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  is	  widely	  known	  and	  used	  in	  financial	  sector.	  It	  was	  first	  proposed	   by	   Fama	   (1965).	   He	   states	   that	   in	   efficient	   market,	   there	   are	   large	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numbers	  of	  rational,	   actively	   competing	   investors	  who	  each	  are	   trying	  to	  predict	  future	   market	   values	   of	   individual	   securities	   assets,	   and	   important	   present	  information	  is	  almost	  freely	  available	  to	  all	  participants.	  Fama	  (1991:	  1583)	  argues	  that	  the	  predictability	  of	  stock	  returns	  from	  dividend	  yields	  is	  not	  enough	  evidence	  for	   or	   against	   market	   efficiency.	   In	   an	   efficient	   market,	   the	   forecast	   power	   of	  dividend	   yields	   says	   that	   prices	   are	   high	   relative	   to	   dividends	   when	   expected	  returns	   and	   discount	   rates	   are	   low,	   and	   vice	   versa.	   Additionally,	   in	   a	   world	   of	  irrational	   bubbles,	   low	   dividend	   yields	   signal	   high	   stock	   prices	   that	   will	   move	  predictably	   back	   toward	   fundamental	   values.	   To	   find	   out	   whether	   the	   forecast	  power	  of	  dividend	  yields	  is	  the	  result	  of	  rational	  variation	  in	  irrational	  bubbles	  or	  expected	  returns,	  other	  information	  must	  be	  used.	  Even	  with	  such	  information,	  as	  always,	  the	  issue	  is	  questionable.	  	  	  The	  efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  random	  walk,	  which	  is	  a	   term	  widely	  used	   in	  the	   finance	   literature	  to	  explain	  a	  price	  series	  where	  all	  subsequent	  price	  movements	  represents	  random	  departures	  from	  previous	  prices.	  The	  idea	  behind	  the	  random	  walk	  is	  that	  if	  the	  stream	  of	  information	  is	  unlimited	  and	  rapidly	  reflected	  in	  stock	  prices,	  then	  tomorrow’s	  price	  change	  will	  reflect	  only	  tomorrow’s	   news	   and	   will	   be	   separated	   of	   the	   price	   changes	   today.	   News	   is	  unpredictable	  and,	  thus,	  the	  upcoming	  price	  changes	  should	  be	  unpredictable	  and	  random.	   As	   a	   result,	   prices	   fully	   reflect	   all	   available	   information,	   and	   even	  uninformed	  investors	  investing	  in	  diversified	  portfolio	  at	  the	  list	  of	  prices	  given	  by	  the	  market	  will	  gather	  a	  rate	  of	  return	  as	  big	  as	  that	  achieved	  by	  the	  experts.	  (Burton	  2003:	  59.)	  Fama	   (1965:	  35)	  points	  out	   that	   the	   theory	  of	  random	  walks	   in	   stock	  prices	   involves	   two	   separate	   hypotheses.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   that	   successive	   price	  changes	  are	  independent.	  Second	  hypothesis	  that	  was	  pointed	  out	  is	  that	  the	  price	  changes	  adjust	  to	  some	  probability	  distribution.	  	  	  The	  efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  is	  based	  on	  some	  preconditions	  (Fama	  1970:	  383):	  	   1.   There	  is	  no	  transaction	  cost	  in	  trading	  securities.	  2.   All	   available	   information	   is	   costless	   and	   available	   to	   all	   market	  participants.	  3.   All	  agree	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  current	  information	  for	  the	  current	  price	  and	  distributions	  of	  future	  prices	  of	  each	  security.	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Those	  three	  preconditions	  stated	  are	  reflecting	  on	  the	  perfect	  situation,	  which	  is	  not	  rather	  realistic.	  In	  a	  more	  realistic	  situation,	  companies	  can	  thus	  make	  appropriate	  decisions	   regarding	   production–investment,	   and	   investors	   can	   regulate	   capital	  flows	  by	  making	  informed	  choices	  between	  stocks.	  Regulated	  capital	  flows	  leads	  to	  capital	  being	  invested	  in	  more	  value	  creating	  projects	  and	  to	  withdraw	  investments	  from	  projects	  that	  are	  not	  going	  to	  create	  so	  much	  value	  in	  the	  future.	  (Bushmann,	  Piotroski	  and	  Smith	  2011.)	  	  Shleifer	  (2000:	  2)	  lists	  three	  assumptions	  of	  efficient	  markets:	  	   1.   Investors	  behave	  rationally	  and	  value	  securities	  rationally.	  2.   If	   some	   investors	   make	   irrational	   decisions,	   their	   trades	   subdue	  each	  other.	  Thus	  they	  do	  not	  affect	  prices.	  3.   Arbitrageurs	  make	  moves	  on	  the	  market	  when	  investors	  tend	  to	  be	  irrational	   and	   have	   an	   adequate	   impact,	   thus	   the	   prices	   do	   not	  move.	  	  	  2.2.	  Different	  forms	  of	  market	  efficiency	  	  Fama	  (1970)	  defines	  three	  forms	  of	  market	  efficiency.	  Three	  different	  forms	  explain	  what	  level	  information	  is	  reflected	  to	  prices.	  The	  three	  forms	  of	  efficiency	  are:	  	   1.   Weak	  form	  of	  market	  efficiency:	  Security	  prices	  reflect	  all	  historical	  information.	  2.   Semi–strong	  form	  of	  market	  efficiency:	  Security	  prices	  reflect	  all	  publicly	  available	  information.	  3.   Strong	  form	  of	  market	  efficiency:	  Security	  prices	  reflect	  all	  information,	  both	  private	  and	  public.	  	  	  2.2.1.	  Weak	  form	  of	  market	  efficiency	  	  In	  the	  weak	  form	  of	  market	  efficiency	  securities,	  prices	  reflect	  all	  past	  information,	  such	  as	  the	  history	  of	  past	  prices	  and	  trading	  volume.	  It	  shows	  that	  when	  markets	  are	  weak	  form	  efficient,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  investors	  to	  gain	  abnormal	  returns	  by	  analyzing	  historical	  data,	  since	  the	  historical	  trading	  data	  has	  already	  been	  reflected	  in	  current	  prices.	  One	  way	  to	  decide	  whether	  capital	  market	  is	  weak	  form	  efficient	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is	  to	  use	  serial	  correlation.	  Bodie,	  Kane	  and	  Marcus	  (2014:	  364)	  state	  that	  one	  way	  of	  discerning	  trends	  in	  stock	  prices	  is	  by	  calculating	  the	  serial	  correlation	  of	  stock	  market	   returns.	   Serial	   correlation	   refers	   to	   the	   tendency	   for	   stock	   returns	   to	   be	  connected	  to	  past	  with	  returns.	  	  	  Technical	   analysis	   is	   basically	   the	   search	   for	   cyclical	   and	   predictable	   patterns	   in	  stock	  prices.	  Technical	  analysis	  can	  then	  be	  used	  for	  weak	  form	  market	  efficiency	  tests.	   Although	   technicians	   see	   the	   value	   of	   information	   about	   future	   economic	  expectations	   of	   a	   company,	   they	   are	   convinced	   that	   such	   information	   is	   not	  mandatory	  for	  a	  triumphant	  trading	  strategy.	  (Bodie	  et	  al.	  2014:	  354.)	  	  2.2.2.	  Semi–strong	  form	  of	  market	  efficiency	  	  In	  the	  semi–strong	  market	  efficiency,	  securities	  prices	  reflect	  all	  publicly	  available	  information,	   such	   as:	   past	   prices,	   quality	   of	   management,	   balance	   sheet	  composition,	   fundamental	  data	  on	   the	   firm’s	  product	   line,	  patents	  held,	   earnings	  forecasts	  and	  accounting	  practices.	  If	  capital	  market	  is	  semi–strong	  efficient,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  also	  weak	   form	  efficient.	   It	   is	   impossible	   for	   investors	   to	  gain	  abnormal	  returns	  by	  using	  fundamental	  analysis,	  since	  all	  financial	  information	  like	  financial	  statements,	  dividends,	   economic	   conditions	  or	  past	  prices	  are	  already	  accurately	  and	  quickly	  reflected	  to	  the	  securities	  prices.	  (Bodie	  et	  al.	  2014:	  354.)	  	  Fama	  (1991)	  creates	  a	  very	  common	  name	  for	  semi–strong	  form	  efficiency,	  called	  event	  studies.	  Bodie	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  explain	  that	  event	  study	  describes	  a	  technique	  of	  empirical	   financial	   research	   that	   enables	  an	  observer	   to	  examine	   the	  effect	  of	   an	  event	  on	  a	  company’s	  stock	  price.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  stock	  market	  analyst	  would	  want	  to	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  dividend	  changes	  on	  stock	  prices,	  an	  event	  study	  would	  explain	   the	   relationship	   between	   stock	   returns	   and	   dividend	   changes.	   For	   the	  analysts	  who	  want	  to	  test	  the	  semi–strong	  market	  form	  efficiency,	  the	  sample	  size	  is	  extremely	  important,	  and	  they	  should	  calculate	  how	  rapidly	  the	  stock	  prices	  react	  to	  the	  information	  announcement.	  	  2.2.3.	  Strong	  form	  of	  market	  efficiency	  	  Last	   form	  of	  market	  efficiency	   is	   the	  strong	   form	  market	  efficiency.	   In	   the	  strong	  form	  market	  efficiency	  securities	  prices	  reflect	  both	  private	  and	  public	  information.	  If	  capital	  market	  is	  strong	  form	  efficient,	  then	  it	  also	  must	  be	  weak	  form	  efficient	  and	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semi–strong	  efficient.	  Strong	  form	  efficiency	  indicates	  that	  the	  securities	  prices	  can	  reflect	   all	   the	   information	   that	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   company,	   even	   the	   information,	  which	  only	  company	  insiders	  can	  access.	  One	  can	  define	  the	  company	  insiders	  as	  the	  managers	  of	  publicly	  traded	  firms	  or	  financial	  experts.	  	  	  The	  strong	  form	  market	  efficiency	  is	  quite	  an	  extreme	  case.	  Few	  would	  argue	  the	  theory	  that	  corporate	  officers	  have	  access	  to	  relevant	  information	  way	  before	  public	  announcement	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  make	  profit	  from	  trading	  with	  that	  information.	  For	   that	   reason,	  much	  of	   the	  activity	  of	   the	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC)	  is	  directed	  toward	  preventing	  insiders	  from	  profiting	  from	  using	  their	  insider	  information.	  (Bodie	  et	  al.	  2014:	  354.)	  Fama	  (1970)	  states	  that	  while	  the	  strong	  form	  market	   efficiency	   holds,	   no	   one	   can	   outperform	   the	  market	   because	   all	   possible	  insider	  information	  is	  reflected	  in	  securities	  correctly	  and	  rapidly.	  Furthermore,	  no	  one	  could	  beat	  consistently	  the	  market	  and	  there	  would	  be	  only	  lucky	  and	  unlucky	  investors.	  	  	  There	   have	   been	   a	   lot	   of	   studies	   on	   how	   insiders	   trade	   profitably	   with	   their	  company’s	   own	   stocks.	   Jaffe	   (1974)	  was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   academics	   to	   study	   the	  tendency	   of	   stock	   prices	   and	   insiders	   trading.	   Results	   show	   that	   insiders,	   who	  intensively	  bought	  their	  own	  company’s	  shares	  made	  their	  company’s	  stock	  prices	  rise,	  and	  when	  insiders	  sold	  their	  company’s	  shares	  it	  made	  their	  company’s	  stock	  prices	   to	   fall.	   Fama	   (1991)	   changes	   the	   semi–strong	   form	  hypothesis	   to	   test	   for	  private	  information	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  revealing,	  if	  the	  company	  insiders	  can	  have	  the	  private	   information.	  Results	   show	   that	   corporate	   insiders	   can	  make	  more	  profits	  over	  normal	  investors	  with	  their	  inside	  information.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Fama	  (1991)	  also	  tries	  to	  find	  out	  how	  pension	  fund	  and	  mutual	  fund	  managers	  could	  generate	  abnormal	  profit.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  professional	  investors	  generally	  could	  not	  make	  more	  profit	  by	  following	  the	  corporate	  insiders.	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3.	  STOCK	  MARKET	  ANOMALIES	  	  Stock	  market	   anomalies	   are	   time	   series	   and	   cross–sectional	   patterns	   in	   security	  returns	  that	  are	  not	  predicted	  by	  a	  known	  theory	  or	  a	  central	  paradigm.	  Findings	  of	  stock	   market	   anomalies	   appear	   from	   empirical	   tests	   that	   rely	   on	   a	   joint	   null	  hypothesis.	   Financial	   markets	   are	   informationally	   efficient	   and	   returns	   behave	  according	  to	  an	  assumed	  equilibrium	  model.	  If	  the	  joint	  hypothesis	  is	  rejected,	  one	  cannot	  point	   the	   rejection	   to	  either	  branch	  of	   the	  hypothesis.	  Thus,	   even	   though	  anomalies	  are	  usually	  explained	  as	  evidence	  of	  inefficient	  market,	  such	  conclusion	  is	  wrong	  because	  the	  rejection	  may	  be	  due	  to	  incorrect	  equilibrium	  model.	  Some	  have	   argued	   that	   once	   researchers	   identify	   stock	   market	   anomalies,	   investors	  immediately	  try	  to	  profit	  from	  it	  somehow,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  anomaly	  to	  disappear.	  Thus,	  anomalies	  can	  also	  disappear,	  if	  the	  researcher’s	  original	  discovery	  was	  only	  a	  sample–specific	  artifact.	  Although	  this	  has	  happened	  for	  a	   few	  anomalies,	  some	  anomalies	   continue	   to	   persist.	   The	   fact	   that	   some	   anomalies	   have	   persisted	   for	  decades	   shows	   that	   they	   are	   not	   evidence	   of	   market	   inefficiencies.	   Rather,	  benchmark	  models	  might	  be	  less	  than	  complete	  descriptions	  of	  equilibrium	  price	  construction.	  (Keim	  2008:	  1.)	  	  According	  to	  Schwert	  (2002:	  1)	  anomalies	  are	  empirical	  results	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  on	  different	   tracks	   with	   maintained	   theories	   of	   asset–pricing	   behavior.	   Anomalies	  demonstrate	   opportunities	   to	   make	   profit,	   which	   means	   that	   markets	   are	   not	  efficient,	  or	  inadequacies	  in	  the	  underlying	  asset–pricing	  model.	  After	  anomalies	  are	  noticed	   and	   evaluated	   in	   the	   academic	   literature,	   they	   often	   tend	   to	   disappear,	  reverse	  or	   reduce.	  This	   raises	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  profit	  opportunities	  were	  present	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  have	  arbitraged	  away,	  or	  whether	  the	  anomalies	  were	  just	  statistical	  oddity	  that	  got	  the	  attention	  of	  investors	  and	  academics.	  	  There	  are	  staggering	  numbers	  of	  researches	  made	  about	  anomalies.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  subject	  is	  so	  interesting	  and	  widely	  reported	  is	  mainly	  because	  every	  investor	  is	  seeking	  ways	  to	  create	  abnormal	  returns	  from	  efficient	  stock	  markets.	  Anomalies	  can	   be	   categorized	   to	   cross–sectional	   and	   time	   series	   anomalies.	   Cross–sectional	  anomalies	  can	  be	  defined	  by	  exploring	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  companies	  that	  has	  some	  deviating	  key	  characteristics.	  Time	  series	  anomalies	  can	  be	  defined	  by	  using	  time	  series	  of	  data.	  Table	  1	  illustrates	  a	  few	  of	  the	  most	  known	  stock	  market	  anomalies.	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Table	  1.	  A	  few	  of	  the	  most	  known	  stock	  market	  anomalies.	  	  
Cross–sectional  anomalies   Time  series  anomalies  
P/E  ratio  effect   Momentum  
Size  effect   January  effect  
Value  effect   The  Weekend  effect  
	  
	  3.1.	  Value	  effect	  	  The	   two	  most	   studied	   cross–sectional	   anomalies	   are	   value	   effect	   and	   size	   effect.	  Value	   effect	   anomaly	   occurs	   when	   value	   stocks	   outperform	   growth	   stocks	   on	  average.	  The	  basic	  idea	  is	  to	  buy	  undervalued	  assets	  and	  sell	  overvalued	  ones.	  It	  is	  not	  as	  easy	  as	  it	  sounds,	  but	  can	  be	  quite	  straightforward.	  The	  traditional	  choice	  of	  value	  measure	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  book	  value	  to	  its	  market	  price,	  also	  known	  as	  B/M.	  The	  B/M	  ratio	  is	  not	  the	  only	  measure	  for	  value.	  Investors	  can	  compare	  for	  example	  earnings,	   cash	   flows,	   and	  sales,	   relative	   to	  price,	   for	  example,	   if	   you	  pick	  a	  set	  of	  stocks	   and	   sort	   them	  by	   some	  measure	   of	   fundamental	   value	   to	   price.	   After	   the	  sorting	  process,	   investor	   should	  go	   long	  or	  overweight	   the	  stocks	  that	  have	  high	  fundamental	  value	  to	  price,	  which	  can	  be	  described	  as	  cheap	  stocks,	  and	  short	  or	  underweight	   the	   ones	   that	   have	   low	   fundamental	   value	   to	   price,	   which	   can	   be	  described	   as	   expensive	   stocks.	   By	   being	   clearly	   long	   and	   short,	   the	   resulting	  portfolio	   has	   extremely	   low	   correlation	  with	   the	   overall	   equity	  market.	   (Asness,	  Ilmanen,	  Israel	  and	  Moskowitz	  2015.)	  Basu	  (1977,	  1983)	  states	  that	  firms	  that	  have	  high	  earning–to–price	  (E/P)	  ratios	  earn	  positive	  abnormal	  returns	  relative	  to	   the	  capital	   asset	  pricing	  model	   (CAPM).	  Many	  other	  papers	  have	   stated	   that	  positive	  abnormal	   returns	   seem	   to	   accumulate	   to	   portfolios	  of	   stocks	  with	  high	   dividend	  yields	   (D/P)	   or	   to	   stocks	   with	   high	   B/M	   ratios.	   Ball	   (1978)	   notices	   that	   such	  evidence	  was	  likely	  to	  indicate	  a	  fault	  in	  the	  CAPM	  rather	  than	  market	  inefficiency.	  Aspects	  that	  would	  cause	  an	  investor	  following	  this	  strategy	  to	  add	  a	  firm	  to	  his	  or	  her	  portfolio	  would	  be	  steady	  over	  time	  and	  easy	  to	  pay	  attention	  to.	  Turnover	  and	  transaction	  costs	  would	  be	  low	  and	  information	  collection	  cost	  would	  be	  low,	  if	  such	  a	  strategy	  earned	  stable	  abnormal	  returns,	  it	  would	  be	  available	  to	  many	  potential	  arbitrageurs	  at	  extremely	  low	  cost	  (Schwert	  2002).	  	  There	  is	  no	  real	  answer	  why	  the	  value	  effect	  anomaly	  still	  exists,	  but	  one	  answer	  that	  has	  been	  under	  a	  lot	  of	  research	  attention	  is	  investors’	  behavioral	  biases.	  For	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example,	   Lakonishok,	   Shleifer	   and	   Vishny	   (1994:	   1541)	   state	   that	   the	   value	  strategies	  yield	  higher	   returns	  because	  of	   the	   suboptimal	  behavior	  of	   the	   typical	  investor,	   and	   not	   because	   value	   strategies	   are	   fundamentally	   riskier.	   Barberis,	  Shleifer	   and	   Vishny	   (1998:	   316)	   state	   that	   value	   effect	   anomaly	   occurs	   when	   a	  company	  has	  a	  consistent	  history	  of	  earning	  growth	  over	  several	  years,	  investors	  might	  think	  that	  the	  history	  is	  showing	  of	  an	  underlying	  earnings	  growth	  potential.	  Hence,	  a	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  high	  growth	  may	  be	  nothing	  but	  a	  random	  good	  run	  for	  a	   few	  lucky	   firms.	  Therefore,	   investors	  using	  the	  representativeness	  heuristic	  might	  disregard	  the	  reality	   that	  a	  history	  of	  high	  earnings	  growth	   is	  not	   likely	   to	  repeat	  itself,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  investors	  will	  overvalue	  the	  company,	  and	  be	  disappointed	   in	   the	   future	  when	   the	   forecasted	   earnings	   growth	   fails	   to	  happen.	  Investors’	  behavioral	  biases	  are	  not	  the	  only	  reasons	  that	  have	  been	  stated.	  There	  has	   been	   studies	   about	   over–reaction	   to	   information	   (Daniel,	   Hirshleifer	   and	  Subrahmanyam	   1998),	   risk–based	   explanation	   like	   value	   assets	   having	   greater	  default	   risk	   (Fama	   and	   French	   1993)	   and	   higher	   long–run	   consumption	   risks	  (Malloy,	  Moskowitz	  and	  Vissing–Jorgensen	  2009).	  	  	  	  3.2.	  Size	  effect	  	  Size	  effect	   is	   also	  widely	   studied	   cross–sectional	   anomaly.	   Size	  effect	  means	   that	  average	   returns	   to	   small	   firms’	   stocks	   are	   considerably	   higher	   than	   any	   known	  capital	   asset	   pricing	   model	   predicts.	   Size	   effect	   refers	   to	   the	   negative	   relation	  between	  stock	  returns	  and	  the	  market	  value	  of	  the	  common	  equity	  of	  a	  company.	  Size	  effect	  also	  shows	  that	  smaller	  companies	  tend	  to	  outperform	  larger	  companies.	  For	  instance,	  if	  larger	  company	  needs	  over	  $	  5	  billion	  to	  achieve	  a	  10	  %	  growth	  rate,	  smaller	  company	  needs	  only	  $	  50	  million	  extra	  sales	  for	  obtaining	  the	  same	  growth	  rate.	  Therefore,	  when	  looking	  the	  numbers,	  smaller	  companies	  can	  grow	  faster	  and	  be	  more	  flexible,	  which	  shows	  in	  smaller	  companies’	  stock	  prices.	  	  	  The	  size	  effect	  anomaly	  is	  one	  of	  the	  best–known	  academic	  market	  anomalies.	  Large	  numbers	  of	  researchers	  and	  academics	  have	  tried	  to	  explain	  the	  ultimate	  reasons	  for	   the	   anomaly.	   (Horowitz,	   Loughran	   and	   Savin	   2000.)	   The	   search	   for	   an	  explanation	   of	   the	   size	   effect	   anomaly	   has	   been	   unsuccessful.	   Fairly	   many	  researchers	   agree	   that	   size	   effect	   anomaly	   is	   evidence	   of	  misspecification	   of	   the	  CAPM,	  rather	  than	  evidence	  of	  inefficient	  capital	  markets	  (Schwert	  1983:	  9).	  Banz	  (1981)	  and	  Reinganum	  (1981)	  present	  that	  small–capitalization	  companies	  on	  the	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New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NYSE)	  earned	  higher	  average	  returns	  than	  is	  predicted	  by	   the	   CAPM	   from	  1936	   to	  1975.	   Banz	   (1981)	  was	   the	   first	   to	   notice	   size	   effect	  anomaly	   for	  U.S.	  stocks.	  This	  evidence	  played	  a	  major	  role	   in	   the	  development	  of	  small–cap	  mutual	  funds	  build	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  size	  premium.	  The	  important	  issue	  for	  investors	  is	  whether	  size	  premium	  for	  small	  cap	  stocks	  is	  still	  positive,	  and	  if	   so,	   whether	   its	  weight	   is	   large.	   Horowitz	   et	   al.	   (2000)	   suggest	   that	   size	   effect	  market	  anomaly	  may	  have	  vanished,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  size	  premium	  may	  even	  have	  gone	   into	   contrarian	   way.	   They	   show	   that	   large–cap	   companies	   appear	   to	   have	  higher	  returns	  than	  small	  companies.	  	  	  	  3.3.	  Price	  to	  earnings	  effect	  	  Basu	   (1977)	   states	   that	   the	  P/E	   ratio	  effect	  makes	   low	  price–earnings	  portfolios	  outperform	   the	   high	   price–earnings	   portfolios.	   During	   the	   years	   1957	   to	   1971	  investors	  earned	  higher	  absolute	  and	  risk–adjusted	  returns	  by	  owning	  low	  price–earnings	  securities.	   It	   is	   thought	   that	   information	  cannot	  be	  used	  quickly	  enough	  and	  there	  are	  frictions	  and	  lags.	  Therefore,	  investors	  could	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  market	  reaction	  due	  to	  transaction	  costs	  and	  tax	  costs.	  	  	  La	  Porta	  (1996)	  reports	  that	  contrarian	  strategies	  which	  use	  analysts’	  assumptions	  to	  create	  portfolios	  yield	  high	  returns.	  When	  he	  analyzed	  portfolios	  based	  on	  the	  stock’s	  P/E	  ratio,	  he	  found	  that	  an	  investment	  strategy	  which	  buys	  shares	  with	  a	  low	  price–to–earnings	  ratio	  and	  short	  sells	  shares	  with	  a	  high	  ratio	  creates	  abnormal	  returns.	  	  	  	  3.4.	  Momentum	  	  	  Momentum	  anomaly	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  known	  anomalies	  there	  is	  in	  the	  financial	  markets.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   most	   studied	   anomalies	   by	  researchers	  and	  academics.	  Momentum	  is	  the	  tendency	  of	  securities,	  in	  every	  asset	  class	  and	  market,	  to	  show	  endurance	  in	  their	  performance	  for	  some	  period	  of	  time.	  After	  being	  reported	  in	  study	  in	  early	  1990s	  in	  U.S.	  equities	  by	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (1993),	  momentum	  has	  been	  documented	  more	  extensively	   in	  multiple	  different	  contexts.	  The	  typical	  approach	  to	  momentum	  is	   to	   look	  at	   the	  past	  12	  months	  of	  stock	   returns,	   going	   long	   position	   the	   ones	   that	   have	   outperformed	   and	   short	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position	  the	  ones	  that	  have	  underperformed.	  By	  being	  long	  and	  short	  at	  the	  same	  time,	   the	   final	   portfolio	   has	   little	   correlation	   to	   passive	   exposure	   to	   traditional	  financial	  markets,	  and	  when	  used	  across	  multiple	  assets,	  it	  captures	  the	  aggregate	  return	  to	  momentum	  while	  diversifying	  away	   idiosyncratic	  security	  risk	  (Asness,	  Ilmanen,	  Israel	  and	  Moskowitz	  2015).	  DeBondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1987)	  report	  that	  long–term	  past	  losers	  outperform	  long–term	  past	  winners	  over	  the	  following	  three	  to	  five	  years.	   Whereas,	   Jegadeesh	   (1990)	   and	   Lehmann	   (1990)	   find	   short–term	   return	  reversals.	  	  	  Asness	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  state	  that	  like	  value	  anomaly,	  momentum	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  linked	   to	   single	   measure,	   for	   example	   to	   own–price	   momentum.	   Measures	   of	  fundamental	  momentum,	  such	  as	  earning	  momentum,	  changes	  in	  analysts’	  forecasts	  for	   stocks	   and	   changes	   in	   profit	   margins	   are	   also	   useful	   in	   creating	   profitable	  portfolios.	   For	   both,	   fundamentally	   and	   price	   based	   momentum	   strategies,	   the	  evidence	  of	  strong	  risk–adjusted	  returns	  is	  universal	  across	  markets	  and	  time.	  Two	  academic	   possible	   sets	   of	   explanations	   for	   momentum	   have	   been	   welling	   in	  academia:	   risk–biased	   and	   behavioral	   theories.	   Risk–biased	   theories	   state	   that	  high–momentum	  stocks	  are	  more	  risky,	  and	  therefore	  require	  higher	  discount	  rate.	  Berk,	   Green	   and	   Naik	   (1999)	   state	   that	   high–momentum	   stocks	   contain	   more	  growth	  options	   in	  earnings,	  which	  makes	  them	  more	  easily	  affected	  to	  aggregate	  shocks.	   In	   addition,	   strong	   correlations	   with	   momentum	   stocks	   suggest	   the	  existence	   of	   a	   common	   source	   of	   risk	   or	   liquidity	   risks	   (Asness,	  Moskowitz	   and	  Pedersen	  2013).	  	  	  Behavioral	  theories	  about	  momentum	  state	  an	  under	  reaction	  in	  the	  short–term	  to	  new	   information	   due	   to	   inattention	   or	   anchoring,	   and/or	   overreaction	   to	   price	  changes.	   Also,	   investor	  herding	  may	   cause	  momentum,	   since	  more	   investors	   are	  buying	  the	  same	  stock	  and	  creating	  it	  more	  desirable.	  To	  add,	  the	  disposition	  effect,	  which	  is	  the	  temptation	  for	  investors	  to	  sell	  winner	  stocks	  too	  soon	  and	  hold	  on	  to	  loser	  stocks	  too	  long	  time,	  may	  be	  a	  major	  reason	  for	  momentum	  (Frazzini	  2006).	  	  	  Chan,	   Jegadeesh	   and	   Lakonishok	   (1996)	   examine	   whether	   the	   predictability	   of	  future	   returns	   from	   past	   returns	   is	   because	   of	   the	   markets	   under	   reaction	   to	  information,	  particularly	  to	  past	  earnings	  news.	  It	  is	  normal	  to	  look	  to	  earnings	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  movements	  in	  stock	  prices,	  so	  Chan	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  view	  this	  path	  to	  rationalize	  the	  existence	  of	  momentum.	  Specially,	  the	  article	  relates	  the	  evidence	  of	  momentum	   in	   stock	   prices	   to	   the	   evidence	   on	   the	   markets	   under	   reaction	   to	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information	  related	  to	  earnings.	  One	  possibility	   to	   the	  profitability	  of	  momentum	  strategies	  is	  because	  of	  the	  component	  of	  medium–horizon	  returns	  that	  is	  related	  to	  this	  earnings–related	  news.	  If	  this	  possibility	  is	  true,	  then	  momentum	  strategies	  will	  not	  be	  profitable	  after	  accounting	  previous	   innovations	   in	  earnings	  and	  earnings	  forecasts.	  	  	  DeLong,	  Shleifer,	  Summers	  and	  Waldmann	  (1990)	  argue	  that	  momentum	  strategies	  create	  profitability	  because	  of	  overreaction	  generated	  by	  positive	  feedback	  trading	  strategies.	  Explanation	  indicates	  that	  “trend–seekers”	  strengthen	  their	  position	  in	  markets	  even	  though	  they	  might	  be	   lacking	   fundamental	   information,	  so	  that	   the	  returns	  for	  past	  losers	  and	  winners	  are	  partly	  brief	  in	  nature.	  Chan	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  state	  that	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  for	  strategies	  based	  either	  on	  earnings	  surprises	  or	  past	  returns	   exploit	   market	   under–reaction	   to	   various	   pieces	   of	   information.	   For	  example,	  earnings	  surprises	  may	  surge	  from	  under	  reaction	  to	  information	  related	  to	   short–term	   earnings,	   while	   a	   price	   momentum	   strategy	   may	   surge	   from	   the	  market’s	   slow	  reaction	   to	  a	  more	  extensive	   set	  of	   information,	   including	   longer–term	   profitability.	   When	   that	   happens,	   it	   can	   be	   expected	   that	   each	   of	   the	  momentum	  strategies	  is	  by	  itself	  successful,	  and	  that	  one	  effect	  is	  not	  incorporated	  by	   the	   other.	   True	   economic	   profits	   are	   imperfectly	   measured	   by	   accounting	  numbers,	  so	  reported	  profits	  may	  be	  lower	  even	  though	  the	  company’s	  future	  sights	  are	  getting	  better.	  If	  the	  stock	  price	  consolidates	  other	  sources	  of	  information	  about	  future	   earnings,	   then	   there	  may	   be	  momentum	   in	   stock	   prices	   even	  with	   lower	  reported	  earnings.	  	  	  	  3.5.	  January	  effect	  	  	  The	  January	  effect	  means	  that,	  if	  the	  stock	  market	  rises	  in	  January,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  keep	  rising	   during	   the	   same	   year’s	   December	   also.	   The	   anomaly	   also	   indicates	   that	   it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  earn	  abnormal	  returns	  during	  January.	  Bhardwaj	  and	  Brooks	  (1992)	  state	  that	  the	  January	  effect	  is	  mostly	  a	  low–share	  price	  effect	  and	  less	  so	  a	  market	  value	  effect.	  Numerous	  articles	  provide	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  view	  that	  the	  January	  effect	  is	  a	  company	  size	  phenomenon.	  However,	  different	  sources	  also	  indicate	   that	   share	   price	   may	   dominate	   company	   size	   in	   explaining	   January	  anomaly.	   Jaffe,	   Keim	   and	   Westerfield	   (1989)	   find	   share	   price	   significant	   in	  explaining	  abnormal	   January	  profits	  after	  control	   for	  company	  size.	  Kross	  (1985)	  state	  that	  the	  size	  effect	  is	  still	  is	  mainly	  a	  price	  effect.	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  Degree	  of	  neglect,	  miss–assessment	  of	  risk,	  transaction	  costs	  and	  infrequent	  trading	  have	  been	  among	   the	   reasons	   to	  explain	   the	  positive	  abnormal	   returns	  on	   small	  company’s	   stocks.	   These	   reasons	   are	   equally	   suitable	   to	   low–priced	   stocks.	   The	  price	  effect	  explanation	  of	  the	  January	  effect	  may	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  gamesmanship	  and	  tax–loss–selling	  hypotheses.	  Both	  hypotheses	  predict	  a	  turn–of–the–year	  effect	  creating	   high	   returns	   for	   stocks	   in	   January,	   which	   are	   likely	   dominated	   by	   low–priced	   stocks.	  Furthermore,	   there	  has	  also	  been	   said	   to	  be	  overestimating	  of	   the	  January	  effect	  due	  to	  evidence	  of	  positive	  turn–of–the–year	  bid–ask	  effect	  in	  returns	  of	   low–priced	   stocks.	   Although	   there	   is	   all	   this	   suggestive	   evidence	   backing	   a	  possible	  price	  effect	  explanation	  of	  the	  January	  effect,	  no	  direct	  reason	  is	  available	  to	  answer	  the	  empirical	  question	  on	  whether	  the	  January	  effect	  is	  more	  reasoned	  with	  control	  for	  a	  price	  effect	  than	  control	  for	  a	  company	  size	  effect.	  (Bhardwaj	  and	  Brooks	  1992.)	  	  	  3.6.	  The	  weekend	  effect	  	  When	  looking	  at	  seasonal	  anomalies,	  the	  most	  interesting	  pattern	  is	  shown	  in	  stock	  returns	  across	  the	  days	  of	  the	  week.	  Several	  researchers	  have	  stated	  that	  mean	  daily	  returns	  differ	  widely.	  Still,	  the	  most	  remarkable	  finding	  from	  different	  studies	  is	  that	  Monday	  returns	  are	  not	  only	  lower	  than	  other	  weekdays,	  but	  close–to–close	  returns	  on	  Mondays	  are	  negative	  averagely.	  Individual	  investors	  tend	  to	  use	  Monday	  as	  a	  chance	  to	  liquidate	  their	  assets,	  which	  makes	  selling	  activity	  higher	  on	  Monday	  than	  on	  any	  other	  weekday.	  Using	  intraday	  S&P	  500	  index	  returns,	  most	  of	  the	  liquidate	  needs	  happen	  before	  11	  a.m.	  on	  Monday	  morning.	  (Abraham	  and	  Ikenberry	  1994.)	  Most	  of	  the	  studies	  made	  of	  the	  weekend	  effect	  include	  only	  the	  U.S.	  stock	  market.	  However,	  Jaffe	  and	  Westerfield	  (1985)	  investigated	  also	  U.K.’s,	  Japan’s,	  Canada’s	  and	  Australia’s	  daily	  stock	  market	  returns	  to	  compare	  them	  with	  U.S.	  stock	  market	  to	  find	  out	  if	  all	  the	  countries	  are	  experiencing	  the	  weekend	  effect.	  Their	  results	  show	  that	  the	  weekend	  effect	  occurs	  in	  all	  stock	  markets.	  	  Lakonishok	  and	  Maberly	  (1990)	  also	  state	  that	  there	  is	  a	  peak	  in	  trading	  activity	  by	  individual	   investors	   on	   Mondays.	   They	   document	   that	   NYSE	   trading	   volume	   is	  higher	  on	  other	  days	  of	  the	  week	  than	  Monday.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  individuals	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  active	  on	  Mondays,	  which	   indicates	   that	  low	  NYSE	  trading	  volume	  on	  Mondays	   is	   a	   conclusion	   of	   lower	   trading	   activity	   by	   institutions.	   To	   add,	   the	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increased	   activity	   by	   individuals	   on	   Mondays	   is	   not	   the	   same	   for	   sell	   and	   buy	  transactions.	  There	  is	  a	  habit	  for	  individual	  investors	  to	  decrease	  the	  number	  of	  buy	  relative	  to	  sell	  transactions.	  	  	  Keim	  and	  Stambaugh	  (1984)	  investigated	  if	  there	  are	  any	  connections	  between	  the	  company	  size	  and	  the	  weekend	  effect.	  They	  state	  that	  the	  weekend	  effect	  occurs	  for	  companies	  in	  all	  different	  sizes.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  smaller	  the	  company	  the	  larger	  is	  the	  bias	  for	  average	  profits	  to	  be	  high	  on	  Friday.	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4.	  DIVIDEND	  PUZZLE	  	  Dividend	   is	  a	  portion	  of	  company’s	  earnings,	  which	  the	  company	  distributes	  to	  a	  class	   of	   their	   shareholders,	   on	   a	   way	   that	   is	   decided	   by	   the	   board	   of	   directors.	  Dividends	   can	  be	   issued	  as	   shares	  of	  stock,	   as	   cash	  payments,	  or	  other	  property.	  Different	   companies	   have	   different	   kind	   of	   dividend	   payout	   policies.	   The	   choice	  what	  kind	  of	  policy	  to	  use	  depends	  on	  several	  factors.	  One,	  for	  example	  is	  to	  invest	  all	   the	   incoming	  money	   to	   new	   investments	   and	   researches,	   so	   that	   there	   is	   no	  dividend	  payout.	  This	  is	  usually	  the	  case,	  when	  the	  companies	  are	  start–ups	  or	  other	  high–growth	  companies,	  which	   invests	  all	   their	  profits	   to	  growth	  and	  expansion.	  Other,	   for	   example	   is	   to	   pay	   a	   certain	   percentage	   of	   company’s	   earnings	   to	  shareholders	  yearly.	  Usually	  larger	  and	  more	  stable	  companies	  pay	  dividends	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis	   to	   their	  shareholders,	  since	  there	  might	  not	  be	  any	  need	  to	   invest	   to	  new	  projects	  or	  research.	  If	  the	  company	  does	  not	  pay	  dividend	  or	  uses	  it	  to	  new	  investments,	  they	  can	  also	  choose	  to	  use	  net	  profits	  to	  repurchase	  their	  own	  shares	  from	  the	  market	  in	  a	  share	  buyback.	  Share	  buybacks	  and	  dividend	  payouts	  do	  not	  change	  the	  fundamental	  value	  of	  company’s	  shares.	  It	  still	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  a	  company	  can	  influence	  the	  price	  of	  its	  shares	  by	  switching	  it	  dividend	  policy.	  The	  most	  common	  statement	  is	  that	  the	  company	  can	  increase	  the	  value	  of	  its	  shares	  by	  increasing	   its	  payout	   ratio.	   Investors	  will	  bid	  up	   the	  prices	  of	   the	   common	  stock	  companies	   that	   pay	   larger	   dividends,	   relative	   to	   similar	   companies,	   which	   pay	  smaller	  dividends.	  This	  creates	  the	  feeling	  that	  investors	  prefer	  a	  dollar	  of	  dividends	  rather	  than	  dollar	  of	  capital	  gains,	  because	  “a	  bird	  in	  the	  hand	  is	  worth	  more	  than	  one	  
in	  the	  bush”.	  (Black	  and	  Scholes	  1974.)	  	  	  	  4.1.	  Dividend	  payout	  policies	  	  The	  first	  empirical	  study	  of	  different	  dividend	  policies	  was	  by	  Lintner	  (1956),	  who	  analyzed	   how	   corporate	   managers	   handle	   dividend	   policy.	   He	   found	   out	   that	  corporate	  managers	  followed	  previous	  dividend	  rates	  actively.	  Management	  in	  most	  cases	   did	   not	   want	   to	   reduce	   dividends,	   since	   they	   had	   benchmarked	   previous	  dividend	   rates.	  Managers	  usually	   have	   reasonably	   definitive	   target	   payout	   ratios	  and	   did	   not	   want	   to	   change	   them.	   During	   the	   years,	   dividend	   payout	   ratio	   is	  increased	  slowly,	  so	  that	  the	  actual	  payout	  ratio	  moves	  closer	  to	  the	  target	  payout	  ratio,	  set	  by	  the	  managers:	  also	  known	  as	  dividend	  smoothing.	  There	  are	  numerous	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different	  dividend	  policies	  which	  companies	  can	  follow	  depending	  on	  the	  frequency	  they	  will	  pay	  dividends.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  used	  policies	  are:	  	   1.   Stable	  dividend	  policy.	  	  2.   Target	  payout	  ratio.	  3.   Residual	  dividend	  policy.	  
	  Under	  the	  stable	  dividend	  policy,	  companies	  aim	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  steady	  dividend	  payout	  every	  year.	  It	  does	  not	  change	  even	  if	  the	  earnings	  for	  the	  company	  are	  volatile	  some	  years.	  Leary	  and	  Michaely	  (2011)	  state	  that	  managers	  appear	  to	  believe	  firmly	  that	  the	   markets	   set	   a	   premium	   on	   companies	   with	   a	   stable	   dividend	   policy.	   Brav,	  Graham,	  Harvey	  and	  Michaely	  (2005)	  even	  state	  that	  managers	  are	  ready	  to	  raise	  external	  capital	  or	  even	  renounce	  positive	  net	  present	  value	  (NPV)	  investments	  to	  avoid	  cutting	  yearly	  dividends.	  	  Companies	   set	   a	   target	   payout	   ratio,	   which	   they	   should	   try	   to	   get	   when	   paying	  dividends.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  company	  is	  using	  a	  stable	  dividend	  policy	  already,	  they	  could	  set	  a	  goal	  for	  long–run	  dividend–to–earnings	  ratio.	  The	  target	  can	  be	  to	  payout	  stated	  amount	  of	  earnings,	  but	  the	  payout	  is	  given	  in	  a	  nominal	  dollar	  amount	  that	  adapts	  to	  its	  goal	  at	  the	  earnings	  baseline	  changes.	  (Leary	  and	  Michaely	  2011.)	  	  The	   residual	   dividend	   policy	   is	   specifying	   that	   managers	   pay	   dividends	   to	  shareholders	  after	  funding	  all	  profitable	  investments.	  Under	  a	  pure	  residual	  policy,	  the	   company	  avoids	   retaining	   internally	   created	  cash	   flow	  unless	  a	  project	   earns	  more	  than	  the	  required	  rate	  of	  return,	  meaning	  that	  the	  project	  has	  a	  positive	  NPV.	  When	  managers	  exhaust	  all	  opportunities	  to	  invest	  in	  positive	  NPV	  projects,	  they	  pay	  the	  residual	  cash	  flow	  as	  dividends.	  The	  dividend	  can	  also	  be	  zero	  if	  company	  is	  experiencing	  capital	  constraints	  or	  has	  more	  investment	  opportunities	  than	  it	  has	  cash	   flow.	   A	   residual	   dividend	   policy’s	   default	   is	   to	   pay	   zero	   dividends,	   yet	   the	  company	  pays	  dividend	  whenever	  meeting	  conditions	  like	  no	  plans	  to	  retire	  debt	  or	  stock	  or	  smaller	  investment	  possibilities	  than	  cash	  flow.	  (Baker	  and	  Smith	  2006.)	  	  	  4.2.	  Can	  dividends	  predict	  stock	  returns?	  	  The	   subject	   has	   been	   studied	   extensively	   and	  many	   analysts	   and	   investors	   have	  been	  trying	  to	  investigate,	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  mechanism	  that	  could	  predict	  the	  stock	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prices.	  Watts	  (1973)	  state	  that	  the	  term	  ‘information	  content	  of	  dividends’	  has	  been	  frequently	   used	   in	   finance	   literature.	   The	   phrase	   leads	   to	   the	   hypothesis,	   which	  argues	   that	   dividends	   tell	   information	   about	   future	   earnings,	   which	   then	   helps	  market	  participants	  to	  predict	  future	  earnings	  more	  precisely.	  Lintner	  (1956)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  academics	  to	  state	  that	  current	  dividends	  counted	  on	  future	  as	  well	  as	  current	  and	  past	  earnings.	  	  Black	  and	  Scholes	  (1974)	  studied	  a	  data	  set	  of	  1050	  firms	  with	  two	  different	  periods,	  first	  from	  1947	  to	  1966	  and	  the	  second	  from	  1950	  to	  1970.	  They	  were	  not	  able	  to	  demonstrate	   any	   differences	   in	   dividend	   yield	   pointing	   to	   differences	   in	   stock	  returns.	  Black	  and	  Scholes	  (1974)	  argued	  that	  dividend	  policy	  plays	  a	  bigger	  role	  when	  changing	  the	  level	  of	  dividend	  payment,	  since	  the	  market	  indicates	  this	  change	  as	  a	  change	  in	  future	  prospects.	  	  Goetzmann	   and	   Jorion	   (1995)	   analyzed	   dividends’	   ability	   to	   predict	   future	   stock	  returns	  for	  a	  long	  time	  period	  from	  1871	  to	  1993	  with	  U.K.	  and	  NYSE	  data.	  Their	  results	   showed	   no	   predictability	   on	   pre–1926	   U.S.	   data,	   but	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  significant	  predictability	  for	  post–1926	  U.K.	  data.	  They	  stated	  that	  due	  to	  the	  long	  time	   period,	   the	   results	   are	   hardly	   consistently	   explanatory	   and	   offered	  survivorship	  as	  an	  explaining	  factor.	  Rozeff	  (1984)	  found	  that	  the	  ratio	  of	  dividend	  yield	   to	   the	   short–term	   interest	   rate	   eases	   the	   explanation	   of	   future	   stock	  performance,	  thus	  rejecting	  the	  random	  walk	  hypothesis	  of	  stock	  prices.	  	  	  4.3.	  Why	  do	  companies	  pay	  dividends?	  
	  An	   intriguing	   question	   is	   why	   companies	   pay	   dividends	   at	   all?	   An	   answer	   that	  pleases	  all	  academics	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  given.	  There	  are	  theories	  that	  dividends	  are	  irrelevant	   in	   a	   sense	   that	   any	   two	   promptly	   chosen	   dividend	   policies	   have	  equivalent	   results.	   Miller	   and	   Modigliani	   (1961)	   created	   the	   Modigliani–Miller	  theorem	  according	  to	  which	  the	  dividends	  paid	  by	  the	  company	  do	  not	  affect	   the	  return	  to	  the	  investor	  or	  the	  value	  of	  the	  shares.	  	  The	  higher	  the	  dividend,	  the	  less	  the	   investor	  makes	  as	   capital	   gains.	  When	  stated	   like	   that,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   the	  dividend	  paid	  does	  not	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  the	  company’s	  business	  decisions.	  Paying	  the	  dividend	  either	  increases	  the	  amount	  of	  new	  money	  made	  by	  issuing	  securities,	  or	  reduces	  the	  amount	  of	  cash	  equivalents	  held	  by	  the	  company.	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Black	  (1976)	  introduces	  an	  example	  of	  Modigliani–Miller	  theorem:	  if	  you	  are	  offered	  to	  have	  $	  2	  today,	  and	  a	  fifty–fifty	  chance	  of	  $	  44	  or	  $	  40	  tomorrow.	  Or	  you	  may	  have	  $	  0	  today,	  and	  a	  fifty–fifty	  chance	  of	  $	  46	  or	  $	  42	  tomorrow.	  Ignoring	  factors	  like	  the	  cost	   of	   holding	   $	   2	   and	   one	   day’s	   interest	   on	   $	   2,	   there	  would	   be	   no	   difference	  between	  those	  two	  choices.	  The	  choice	  between	  a	  common	  stock	  that	  pays	  dividend	  and	  a	  stock	  that	  pays	  no	  dividend	  is	  identical,	  if	  ignoring	  transaction	  costs	  and	  taxes.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  dividend	  paying	  stock	  drops	  on	  the	  ex–dividend	  date	  by	  around	  the	  same	  amount	  as	  the	  dividend.	  The	  dividend	  only	  drops	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  plausible	  stock	  prices	  by	  that	  amount.	  The	  investor,	  who	  gets	  a	  $	  2	  dividend,	  gets	  shares	  that	  are	  worth	  around	  $	  2	  less	  than	  they	  would	  have	  been	  if	  the	  company	  never	  paid	  the	  dividend.	   The	   vital	   assumption	   in	   Modigliani–Miller	   theorem	   is	   that	   the	   future	  market	  value	  will	  remain	  the	  same	  by	  current	  dividends.	  	  	  Bhattacharya	   (1982)	   finds	   that	   with	   Modigliani–Miller	   theorem	   it	   can	   be	   even	  showed	  that	  dividends	  are	  harmful	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  company:	  when	  investors	  are	  homogenous,	  markets	  are	  perfect	  and	  complete,	  and	  investors	  have	  time–additive	  utility	  functions.	  It	  does	  not	  matter,	  if	  dividends	  contain	  information	  value	  or	  not.	  In	  real	  world	  things	  are	  slightly	  different:	   investors	  are	  heterogeneous,	  markets	  are	  not	  perfect	  and	  complete,	  or	  investors	  have	  non–additive	  utility	  function.	  	  Traditionally,	   dividend	   payout	   policy	   of	   a	   company	   is	   said	   to	   be	   the	   result	   of	  dividend	  signaling	  or	  agency	  costs.	  Miller	  and	  Rock	  (1985)	  document	  that	  signaling	  models	  of	  dividend	  behavior	  argue	  that	  managers	  might	  use	  company’s	  dividend	  payouts	  to	  signal	  private	  information	  about	  their	  expectation	  of	  future	  cash	  flows.	  Signaling	  models	  are	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  dividends	  are	  costly	  and	  can	  be	  used	  by	  management	  as	  a	  dependable	  signal	  of	  private	  information.	  John	  and	  Williams	  (1985)	  discovered	  a	  signaling	  equilibrium	  with	  taxable	  dividends,	  where	  corporate	  insiders	  with	  more	  valuable	  private	  information	  optimally	  pays	  out	  more	  significant	  dividends	  and	  receives	  higher	  prices	  for	  their	  stock	  whenever	  the	  demand	  for	  cash	  by	  both	  their	  company	  and	  its	  current	  stockholders	  tops	  its	  internal	  supply	  of	  cash.	  In	  equilibrium,	  many	  companies	  distribute	  dividends,	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	   issue	  new	   stocks,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   many	   companies	   pay	   no	   dividend	   at	   all.	   Since	  dividends	  reveal	  all	  private	  information	  not	  revealed	  by	  corporate	  audits,	  current	  stockholders	  capture	  in	  equilibrium	  all	  economic	  rents	  net	  of	  useless	  signaling	  costs.	  As	  managers	  decide	  on	  dividend	  increase,	  it	  signals	  a	  persistent	  improvement	  in	  the	  future	  cash	  flows.	  It	  creates	  a	  situation	  also	  to	  the	  competitors,	  since	  they	  cannot	  also	  increase	  dividend	  because	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  later	  cut	  the	  dividend.	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  Easterbrook	   (1984)	  argues	   that	   agency	   cost	  models	  make	  companies	  pay	  higher	  dividends	  when	   they	   encounter	   higher	   agency	   costs.	   If	  managers	   are	   free	   to	   use	  company’s	   excess	   cash	   flows	   to	   their	   own	   benefits,	   the	   costs	   go	   straight	   to	  shareholders.	  Managers	  could	  be	  able	  to	  mitigate	  some	  of	  the	  agency	  costs	  by	  paying	  out	   the	   excess	   cash	   flows	   as	   dividends.	   He	   adds	   that	   dividends	   may	   keep	   the	  companies	  in	  the	  capital	  market,	  where	  monitoring	  of	  managers	  is	  possible	  at	  lower	  cost,	  and	  may	  be	  useful	  when	  adjusting	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  taken	  by	  the	  managers	  and	  the	  different	  classes	  of	  investors.	  	  More	   recently	   researchers	   have	   considered	   other	   explanations	   for	   company’s	  dividend	  payout	   policy.	   Baker	   and	  Wurgler	   (2004)	   propose	   a	   view	  of	   dividends,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  market	  efficiency	  assumption	  of	  the	  dividend	  irrelevance.	  It	  proves	   that	   dividend	   policy	   is	   irrelevant	   to	   share	   value	   in	   efficient	   and	   perfect	  capital	  markets,	  first	  noted	  by	  Modigliani	  and	  Miller	  (1961).	  The	  core	  of	  Baker	  and	  Wurgler’s	  (2004)	  catering	  theory	  is	  that	  managers	  answer	  to	  investors’	  needs	  for	  what	   they	   currently	   want.	   When	   looking	   at	   dividends,	   catering	   suggests	   that	  managers	  tend	  to	  give	  dividends	  when	  investors	  put	  a	  rather	  high	  stock	  price	  on	  dividend	  payers,	  and	  usually	  ignores	  dividends	  when	  investors	  prefer	  nonpayers.	  	  	  One	   reason	   for	   dividend	   payouts	   addresses	   agency	   problems	   between	   company	  insiders	   and	   outside	   shareholders.	   According	   to	   different	   theories,	   unless	  company’s	   profits	   are	   paid	   out	   to	   shareholders,	   they	   may	   be	   redirected	   by	   the	  company	  insiders	  for	  personal	  use,	  or	  executed	  to	  unprofitable	  investments,	  which	  creates	   private	   benefits	   for	   only	   the	   company	   insiders.	   Therefore,	   outside	  shareholders	  rather	  want	  the	  company’s	  profits	  to	  be	  distributed	  as	  dividends,	  than	  retained	   as	   earnings.	   Theories	   differ	   on	  how	  outside	   shareholders	   really	   get	   the	  companies	   to	   pay–out	   the	   dividends.	   The	   main	   point	   of	   view	   from	   the	   outsider	  shareholders	  is	  that,	  if	  the	  company	  does	  not	  pay	  dividends,	  the	  profit,	  which	  stays	  in	  the	  company	  has	  a	  chance	  not	  to	  create	  any	  profitable	  investments	  for	  the	  future	  and	   could	   be	  wasted	  without	   any	   benefits	   to	   shareholders.	   The	   agency	   problem	  theory	  moves	   away	   from	   the	  Modigliani–Miller	   theorem	   by	   noticing	   two	   things.	  First,	  the	  allocation	  of	  all	  the	  profits	  of	  the	  company	  to	  shareholders	  on	  a	  pro	  rata	  basis	  cannot	  be	  assumed,	  and	  specifically,	   the	  company	   insiders	  may	  get	   favored	  treatment	  with	  transfer	  prices,	  asset	  diversion	  and	  theft,	  even	  if	  the	  company	  has	  a	  constant	   investment	   policy.	   Considering	   when	   dividends	   are	   paid	   on	   a	   pro	   rata	  basis,	  insiders	  benefit	  more	  than	  outside	  shareholders	  relative	  to	  the	  alternative	  of	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expropriation	  of	  retained	  earnings.	  Secondly,	  the	  investment	  policy	  of	  the	  company	  cannot	  be	  thought	  as	  independent	  of	  company’s	  dividend	  policy.	  When	  company	  is	  paying	  out	  dividends,	   it	  may	  reduce	  the	   inefficiency	  of	  marginal	   investments.	   (La	  Porta,	  Lopez–de–Silanes,	  Shleifer	  and	  Vishny,	  2000:	  2.)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.4.	  Stock	  repurchases	  	  When	   companies	   do	   not	   pay	   dividends	   to	   their	   shareholders,	   or	   there	   are	   no	  potential	  growth	  opportunities	  or	  investments	  arising,	  companies	  can	  repurchase	  its	   own	   stocks.	   Companies	   may	   repurchase	   stocks	   for	   a	   numerous	   of	   different	  reasons.	  The	  decision	  to	  do	  it	  is	  therefore	  affected	  by	  the	  company’s	  distribution,	  capital	   structure,	   corporate	   control,	   investment	   and	   compensation	   policies.	  Most	  articles	  study	  how	  these	  corporate	  decisions	  influence	  the	  decision	  to	  repurchase.	  However,	  most	  articles	  focus	  on	  one	  or	  two	  reasons.	  When	  focusing	  on	  only	  a	  few	  reasons,	   researchers	   limit	   the	   results	   first	   by	   ignoring	   other	   potential	   motives,	  which	  may	  affect	   the	  repurchase	  decision	  significantly,	  and	  secondly,	  by	   ignoring	  the	  relation	  between	  these	  hypotheses	  and	  allowing	  for	  the	  option	  that	  companies	  will	  only	  repurchase	  stocks	  if	  more	  than	  one	  criterion	  is	  met.	  For	  example,	  multiple	  articles	  focus	  on	  company’s	  distribution	  policy	  and	  the	  choice	  between	  dividends	  and	  repurchases.	  Yet,	  distribution	  policy	  is	  only	  one	  of	  the	  influences	  on	  company’s	  choice	  to	  repurchase	  (Dittmar	  2000).	  	  There	   are	   numerous	   different	   articles	   about	   companies	   repurchasing	   their	   own	  stocks.	   For	   example,	   Jensen	   (1986)	   states	   that	   companies	   repurchase	   stocks	   to	  allocate	   excess	   cash	   flows.	   Stephens	   and	   Weisbach	   (1998)	   found	   a	   positive	  correlation	   between	   levels	   of	   cash	   flows	   and	   stock	   repurchases.	   Stephens	   and	  Weisbach	  (1998)	  also	  found	  that	  repurchase	  is	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  previous	  stock	  returns,	  showing	  that	  companies	  repurchase	  stock	  when	  their	  stock	  prices	  are	  recognized	  as	  undervalued.	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  for	  a	  company	  to	  repurchase	  its	  stocks.	  Brennan	  and	  Thakor	  (1990)	  talks	  about	  open	  market	  repurchases	  and	  tender	   offer	   repurchases,	   which	   are	   regulated	   by	   the	   Securities	   and	   Exchange	  Commission.	  Both	  involve	  corporate	  purchases	  of	  stocks	  through	  a	  broker	  at	  current	  market	   prices.	   There	   is	   no	   official	   need	   to	   announce	   open	  market	   repurchases,	  although	  most	  companies	  still	  announce	  them.	  For	  individual	  investors,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  exact	  day	  when	  open	  market	  repurchases	  are	  actually	  happening,	  since	  the	   process	   can	  often	   extend	   over	  months	   and	   even	   years.	   Companies	   announce	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when	  the	  repurchase	  program	  is	  completed.	  Other	  popular	  way	  for	  a	  company	  to	  repurchase	  its	  stocks	  is	  the	  tender	  offer	  repurchase,	  where	  typically	  the	  amount	  of	  stocks	  to	  be	  repurchased	  at	  a	  given	  price	  is	  usually	  higher	  than	  the	  current	  market	  price.	  The	  company	  usually	  reserves	  the	  right	  to	  prolong	  the	  offer	  from	  its	  original	  concept	  of	   three	  weeks	  to	  a	  month,	   the	  right	   to	  repurchase	  more	  stocks,	  and	  the	  right,	   if	  more	   than	   the	   stated	   amount	   of	   stocks	   is	   tendered,	   to	   repurchase	  more	  stocks	   on	   a	   pro–rata	   basis.	   Typical	   tender	   offer	   repurchases	   are	   usually	  substantially	   larger	   than	   typical	  open	  market	  repurchases.	  The	  way	   in	  which	   the	  repurchase	  is	  done	  will	  have	  ramifications	  for	  the	  wealth	  redistribution	  between	  the	  uninformed	  and	  informed	  shareholders,	  and	  therefore,	  will	  create	  different	  reasons	  for	  the	  gathering	  of	  information	  by	  shareholders.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  fixed	  cost	  of	  collecting	  information,	  large	  shareholders	  will	  have	  bigger	  incentive	  to	  get	  information	  than	  small	  shareholders.	  Therefore,	  stock	  repurchases	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  a	  redistribution	  of	  assets	  from	  small	  shareholders	  to	  large	  shareholders.	  	  	  	  Dittmar	  (2000)	  examines	  different	  hypotheses	  why	  companies	  repurchase	  stocks.	  One	   hypothesis	   is	  Excess	   Capital	   Hypothesis:	   Repurchases	   and	   Distribution	   Policy.	  Repurchasing	  stock,	  like	  paying	  dividends,	  is	  one	  way	  to	  distribute	  excess	  capital	  to	  shareholders.	  A	  repurchase	  may	  be	  done	  before	  paying	  dividends	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	   in	  open	  market	  purchases,	  which	  are	   the	  most	   common	   type,	   the	   company	  does	  not	  have	  a	  commitment	  to	  repurchase.	  To	  add,	  unlike	  a	  dividend,	  there	  is	  no	  expectation	   that	   the	   repurchase	   would	   happen	   on	   a	   regular	   basis.	   Thus,	   a	  repurchase	  is	  a	  more	  flexible	  means	  of	  distributing	  capital	  since	  a	  penalty	  is	  included	  if	  distributions	  are	  subsequently	  diminished.	  Companies	  may	  therefore	  choose	  to	  repurchase	   to	   distribute	   excess	   capital.	   Secondly,	   stock	   repurchases	   may	   be	  preferred	  over	  dividends	  as	  a	  means	  of	  distribution	  due	  to	  the	  personal	   tax–rate	  advantage	  of	  capital	  gains.	  The	  tax	  advantage	  of	  stock	  repurchases	  exists	  because	  capital	  gains	  are	  often	  taxed	  at	  a	  lower	  rate	  than	  dividend	  income.	  Only	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  repurchase	  that	  is	  capital	  gain	  is	  taxed,	  and	  investors	  can	  waive	  the	  capital	  gains	  tax	  until	  they	  realize	  the	  return	  and	  sell	  their	  stock.	  Thus,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  capital	   gains	   tax	   rate	   would	   decrease	   the	   relative	   advantage	   of	   repurchases.	   If	  repurchases	   and	   dividends	   are	   substitutes,	   then	   stock	   repurchases	   should	   be	  negatively	  related	  to	  company’s	  dividend	  payout	  ratio.	  	  Dittmar’s	  (2000)	  other	  hypothesis	   is	  Undervaluation	  Hypothesis:	  Repurchases	  and	  
Investment	   Policy.	   Stock	   repurchases	   offer	   movement	   not	   only	   in	   the	   choice	   to	  distribute	   excess	   funds,	   but	   also	   when	   to	   distribute	   these	   excess	   funds.	   This	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flexibility	  in	  timing	  is	  favorable	  because	  companies	  can	  wait	  to	  repurchase	  until	  the	  stock	  price	  is	  undervalued.	  The	  undervaluation	  hypothesis	  assumes	  that	  information	  asymmetry	  between	  shareholders	  and	  company	  insiders	  may	  cause	  a	  company	  to	  be	  valued	  wrongly.	  If	  insiders	  believe	  that	  the	  stock	  is	  undervalued,	  the	  company	  can	  repurchase	  stock	  as	  a	  signal	  to	  the	  market,	  or	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  invest	  in	  its	  own	   stock	   and	   buy	   mispriced	   shares.	   According	   to	   this	   hypothesis,	   the	   market	  defines	  the	  action	  as	  an	   indication	  that	   the	  stock	   is	  mispriced.	  The	  positive	  stock	  price	   reaction	  at	   the	  announcement	  of	   a	  stock	   repurchase	   should	  price	   the	   stock	  correctly.	   Ikenberry,	   Lakonishok	   and	   Vermaelen	   (1995)	   demonstrate	   that	   this	  increase	  may	   not	   be	   enough	   to	   correct	   the	   price	   since	   repurchasing	   companies,	  mainly	  low	  market–to–book	  companies,	  earn	  a	  positive	  abnormal	  return	  during	  the	  4	   years	   after	   the	   announcement.	   The	   amount	   of	   information	   available	   and	   the	  accuracy	   of	   the	   valuation	   companies	   by	   the	   market	   can	   influence	   companies	  repurchase	  decisions.	  	  	  	  4.5.	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Dow	  	  Different	  dividend	  yield	  strategies	  have	  been	  under	  the	  investors’	  and	  researchers’	  radars	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  The	  first	  academic	  research	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  stock	  prices	  and	  dividend	  yields	  was	  done	  by	  Walter	  (1956).	  He	  studied	  three	  different	  groups	   of	   stocks:	   intermediate	   stocks,	   growth	   stocks	   and	   creditor	   stocks	  (comparable	  to	  value	  stocks)	  and	  the	  dividend	  policies	  in	  these	  groups.	  Filbeck	  and	  Visscher	  (1997)	  explain	  that	  dividend	  yield	  strategies	  are	  a	  part	  of	  an	  investment	  strategy	  generally	  known	  as	  ‘value	  investing’.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  securities	  called	  as	  value	  stocks	  have	  low	  prices	  relative	  to	  current	  income	  and	  dividend	  levels,	  as	  well	  as	  slower	  than	  average	  growth.	  Value	  investing	  strategies	  state	  that	  to	  achieve	  superior	   long–term	   performance	   investor	   has	   to	   purchase	   stocks,	   which	   are	  currently	  a	  bargain	  relative	  to	  current	  underlying	  fundamental	  analysis.	  	  	  	  The	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Dow	  (DoD)	  was	  first	  introduced	  by	  John	  Slatter,	  who	  suggested	  a	  simple	  investment	  strategy	  of	  calculating	  the	  dividend	  yields	  of	  all	  the	  stocks	  in	  the	  Dow	   Jones	   Industrial	   Average	   (DJIA)	   index,	   and	   then	   ranking	   dividend	   yields	   to	  order	  and	  identifying	  the	  top	  10	  dividend	  yield	  stocks,	  then	  buying	  the	  10	  stocks	  in	  equal	   dollar	   amounts	   or	   equally	   weighting	   them	   in	   portfolio	   containing	   the	   10	  stocks,	   then	   holding	   the	   portfolio	   for	   one	   year	   and	   after	   that	   repeat	   from	   the	  beginning.	   There	   are	   also	   other	   strategies	   that	   work	   like	   DoD,	   where	   investor	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chooses	  high	  dividend	  yield	   stocks	  or	  underperformers.	  These	  strategies	  are	  The	  
Puppies	  of	   the	  Dow	  (PoD,	  DoD–5),	  where	   investors	  buy	  the	   five	  highest	  dividends	  yielding	  and	  cheapest	   stocks	  of	   the	  DoD	  strategy,	   the	  Penultimate	  Profit	  Prospect	  (PPP,	  DoD–1)	  strategy,	  which	  selects	  the	  second	  least	  expensive	  stock	  from	  the	  PoD	  strategy.	  Dorfman	  (1988)	   investigated	  the	  performance	  of	  DoD	  portfolio	   through	  the	  years	  1972	  to	  1988	  and	  found	  that	  the	  DoD	  strategy	  outperforms	  the	  DJIA	  index	  by	  7.6	  %	  for	  each	  year.	  The	  DoD	  is	  quite	  popular	  among	  both	  individual	  as	  well	  as	  institutional	  investors,	  and	  among	  a	  number	  of	  financial	  academics	  as	  the	  Table	  2	  demonstrates.	  	  	  
Table	   2.	   Some	   previous	   DoD	   strategies’	   market–adjusted	   returns	   in	   different	  countries	  and	  markets	  (Rinne	  and	  Vähämaa	  2011):	  	  
Author(s)	   Time	  period	   Market	   Return	  Rinne	   &	   Vähämaa	  (2011)	   1988–2008	   Finland	   4.5	  %	  Brzeszczyński	   &	  Gajdka	  (2008)	   1997–2007	   Poland	  	   13.96	  %	  Ap	  Gwilym,	  Seaton	  &	  Thomas	  (2005)	   1980–2001	   United	  Kingdom	   2.11	  %	  Filbeck	  &	  Visscher	  (2003)	   1988–1997	   Canada	   6.62	  %	  Da	  Silva	  (2001)	   1994–1999	   Argentina	  	   0.66	  %	  Da	  Silva	  (2001)	   1994–1999	   Brazil	   –4.26	  %	  Da	  Silva	  (2001)	   1994–1999	   Chile	   3.09	  %	  Da	  Silva	  (2001)	   1994–1999	   Colombia	   0.56	  %	  Da	  Silva	  (2001)	   1994–1999	   Mexico	   0.69	  %	  Da	  Silva	  (2001)	   1994–1999	   Peru	   0.21	  %	  Da	  Silva	  (2001)	   1994–1999	   Venezuela	   1.25	  %	  Hirschey	  (2000)	   1961–1998	   U.S.	   1.77	  %	  Filbeck	  &	  Visscher	  (1997)	   1985–1994	   United	  Kingdom	   –2.10	  %	  O’Higgins	   &	  Downes	  (1991)	   1973–1991	   U.S.	   6.18	  %	  Dorfman	  (1988)	   1972–1988	   U.S.	   7.59	  %	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  The	  Table	  2	  shows	  that	  the	  DoD	  strategy	  has	  performed	  well	  in	  the	  Canadian	  and	  U.S.	  markets,	  and	  not	  so	  well	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  Latin	  American	  markets.	  Filbeck	  and	  Visscher	  (1997)	  were	  the	  first	  who	  investigated	  the	  DoD	  strategy	  outside	  the	  U.S.	  markets.	  Their	  data	  includes	  UK	  data	  from	  1985	  to	  1994	  and	  they	  create	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  from	  the	  FTSE–100	  index.	  In	  previous	  studies	  have	  been	  explanations	  for	  the	   outperformance	   of	   the	   DoD	   strategy	   due	   to	   the	   value	   premium	   or	   simply	  inadequate	  adjustments	  for	  risk,	  taxes	  and	  transaction	  costs;	  some	  researchers	  say	  that	  the	  outperformance	  of	  the	  DoD	  strategy	  is	  clearly	  a	  compensation	  for	  higher	  risks	  (Rinne	  and	  Vähämaa	  2011).	  	  	  Lin	  (2017)	  points	  out	  that	  there	  are	  mutual	  funds	  that	  track	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  DoD	  strategy.	  To	  list	  a	  few	  of	  them,	  the	  ELEMENTS	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Dow	  High	  Yield	  Select	  10	   Exchange–traded	   fund	   (ticker:	   DOD),	   Hennessy	   Balanced	   Fund	   (HBFBX),	  Hennessy	  Total	  Return	  Fund	   (HDOGX)	  and	   Invesco	  Select	  10	   Industrial	  Portfolio	  (SDOW)	  are	  funds	  which	  track	  the	  DoD	  strategy	  and	  tries	  to	  make	  profit	  from	  it.	  	  	  	  4.6.	  Companies	  with	  high	  dividend	  yields	  during	  market	  upturns	  and	  downturns	  	  Gombola	  and	  Lin	  (1993a)	  investigated	  the	  relationship	  between	  stock	  returns	  and	  dividend	  yields	  over	  bull	  (market	  upturn)	  and	  bear	  (market	  downturn)	  markets	  for	  time	  period	   from	  1970	  to	  1984.	  They	  show	  that	  high	  dividend	  yield	  had	  positive	  relationship	   with	   the	   stock	   price	   during	   market	   downturns	   and	   negative	  relationship	   during	   market	   upturns	   for	   the	   whole	   time	   period.	   Even	   after	   they	  controlled	   for	   January	   effect,	   firm	   size	   and	   market	   risk,	   the	   results	   were	   still	  consistent.	   Gombola	   and	   Lin	   (1993b)	   added	   the	   dividend	   size	   and	   the	   dividend	  stability	  in	  to	  their	  continued	  study.	  They	  used	  data	  from	  time	  period	  from	  1969	  to	  1984,	   including	   1080	   companies	   in	   the	   U.S.	   markets,	   and	   found	   that	   the	   risk	   of	  constant	  high	  dividend	  yield	  stocks	  could	  not	  be	  sufficiently	  explained	  by	  beta.	  They	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  beta	  has	  tendency	  to	  decrease	  with	  the	  increasing	  dividend	  stability	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  increase	  for	  the	  low	  dividend	  yield	  stocks.	  	  	  Blume	  (1980)	  researched	  that	  high	  dividend	  yield	  companies	  are	  able	  to	  outperform	  low	  dividend	  yield	  companies	  during	  market	  downturns.	  He	  also	  found	  that	  stocks	  with	  anticipated	  yields	   in	  excess	  of	   the	  mean	  market	  dividend	  yield	  were	  able	   to	  create	  more	  return	  than	  non–dividend	  paying	  stocks	  at	  each	  level	  of	  beta.	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  4.7.	  Taxation	  issues	  	  The	  dividends	  are	  as	  popular	  as	  ever,	  and	  during	  recent	  years,	  taxation	  on	  dividends	  has	  reduced.	  The	  exact	  amount	  of	  taxes	  varies	  by	  taxpayer,	  of	  course.	  For	  example,	  for	  most	  taxpayers,	  in	  the	  25	  %	  or	  higher	  tax	  bracket,	  dividends	  are	  taxed	  at	  15	  %.	  Assumed	  that	  some	  stock	  exchange	  index	  yields	  3	  %	  this	  year,	  if	  investor	  invests	  $	  10	  000	  in	  the	  index,	  investor	  would	  receive	  $	  300	  in	  dividends	  that	  would	  be	  taxable.	  However,	  if	  the	  investor	  were	  in	  the	  10	  %	  or	  15	  %	  tax	  bracket	  investor’s	  tax	  rate	  in	  dividends	  would	  be	  0	  %.	  The	  change	  in	  the	  tax	  law	  became	  active	  during	  the	  year	  2013.	  	  Poterba	  and	  Summers	  (1984)	  argue	  that	  many	  individual	  investors	  should	  value	  a	  dollar	  of	   company	  dividends	   less	   than	  a	  dollar	  of	   corporate	   retentions,	   since	   the	  former	  makes	  tax	  liabilities	  greater.	  However,	  companies	  face	  equal	  costs	  no	  matter	  if	  they	  pay	  dividends	  or	  retain	  earnings.	  As	  already	  stated,	  with	  Modigliani–	  Miller	  theorem,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   taxes,	   dividend	  policy	   should	   not	  make	   difference	   on	  share	  valuation.	  When	  dividends	  are	   tax	  penalized,	   a	  value	  maximizing	   company	  should	  not	  pay	  dividends.	  	  	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  state	  that	  there	  are	  two	  different	  views	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  taxes	  on	  the	  valuation	  of	  dividends.	  The	  more	  traditional	  view	  states	  that	  heavy	  taxation	  of	  dividends	  at	  both	  investor	  and	  company	  levels	  is	  a	  significant	  obstacle	  to	  paying	  out	   dividends	   rather	   than	   retaining	   the	   earnings.	   This	   view	   has	   an	   important	  objection	   raised	  by	  Miller	  and	  Scholes	   (1978).	  They	   state	   that	   investors	   can	   find	  multiple	  different	  dividend	  tax	  avoidance	  strategies	   that	  allow	  them	  to	  efficiently	  avoid	  dividend	  taxes	  partly.	  The	  second	  view	  is	  the	  new	  view	  of	  dividend	  and	  taxes,	  which	   states	   that	   cash	  must	  be	  paid	  out	  as	  dividends	   sooner	  or	   later.	  Therefore,	  paying	  cash	  as	  dividends	  earlier	  does	  not	  create	  greater	  tax	  burden	  on	  shareholders	  than	  paying	  it	  later	  (Auerbach	  1979).	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  taxes	  do	  not	  restrain	  dividend	  payouts.	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5.	  FUNDAMENTALS	  OF	  PORTFOLIO	  MANAGEMENT	  	  New	   information	   affects	   to	   market	   prices	   and	   are	   absorbed	   quickly.	   Especially	  nowadays	  when	  information	  is	  easy	  to	  find	  for	  everyone	  the	  prices	  reflect	  their	  true	  value	  within	  brief	  time	  period.	  There	  are	  different	  models	  to	  valuate	  stock	  returns	  and	  their	  risk.	  In	  this	  chapter	  examples	  of	  the	  most	  used	  models	  are	  displayed.	  	  	  	  5.1.	  Modern	  portfolio	  theory	  	  One	   of	   the	  main	   issues	   for	   investors	   is	  how	   to	   spread	  wealth	   among	   alternative	  assets.	   Many	   financial	   institutions	   have	   the	   same	   dilemma	   with	   the	   increased	  complication	  that	  they	  need	  to	  clearly	  include	  the	  aspects	  of	  their	  liabilities	  in	  the	  analysis.	   Both	   can	   be	   classified	   as	   portfolio	   theory,	   although	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  problems	  is	  a	  little	  dissimilar.	  Markowitz	  (1952)	  is	  the	  founder	  of	  modern	  portfolio	  theory.	  He	  defined	  the	  portfolio	  dilemma	  as	  a	  choice	  of	  the	  variance	  and	  mean	  of	  portfolio	  of	  assets.	  Markowitz	  showed	  the	  fundamental	  theorem	  of	  mean	  variance	  portfolio	  theory,	  specially	  holding	  constant	  variance,	  maximizing	  expected	  return,	  and	  keeping	  constant	  expected	  return	  minimizes	  variance.	  These	  two	  assumptions	  created	  the	  formulation	  of	  an	  efficient	  frontier	  from	  which	  the	  investor	  could	  pick	  a	  portfolio	   that	  meets	   investor’s	  risk	  return	  preferences.	  Key	  point	  of	   the	  theory	   is	  that	  assets	  could	  not	  be	  chosen	  only	  on	  characteristics	  that	  are	  one	  of	  a	  kind	  to	  the	  security.	   An	   investor	   has	   to	   consider	   how	   one	   security	   co–move	   with	   all	   other	  securities.	   In	   addition,	   when	   investor	   considers	   the	   co–movements	   between	  securities,	  he	  or	  she	  can	  achieve	  a	  portfolio,	  which	  has	  the	  same	  expected	  return	  and	  less	   risk	   than	  a	  portfolio,	  where	   investor	  has	  not	   considered	   the	   co–movements.	  (Elton	  and	  Gruber	  1997:	  1743–1744.)	  	  According	  to	  Bodie	  et	  al.	  (2014:	  208),	  the	  expected	  return	  of	  a	  portfolio	  is	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  expected	  returns	  on	  the	  component	  securities	  with	  portfolio	  proportions	  as	  weights:	  	  (2)	   	   𝐸:𝑟;< = ∑ 𝑤?@?A6 𝐸(𝑟?)	  	  where	  𝐸(𝑟;)	  =	  Expected	  return	  of	   the	  portfolio	  p,	  𝑤? 	  =	  Weight	  of	   the	  asset	   i	   in	   the	  portfolio,	  𝑛	  =	  Number	  of	  assets	  in	  the	  portfolio	  and	  𝐸(𝑟?)	  =	  Expected	  return	  of	  the	  asset	  i	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  “The	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  (𝜎)	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  risk.	  It	  is	  defined	  as	  the	   square	   root	   of	   the	   variance,	   which	   is	   the	   expected	   value	   of	   the	   squared	  deviations	   from	   the	   expected	   return.	   The	   higher	   the	   volatility	   in	   outcomes,	   the	  higher	  will	  be	  the	  average	  value	  of	   these	  squared	  deviations.	  Therefore,	  variance	  and	   standard	   deviation	   provide	   one	   measure	   of	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   outcomes.”	  (Bodie	  et	  al.	  2014:	  129.)	  Mathematically	  the	  variance	  can	  be	  calculated:	  	  (3)	   	   𝜎7 = ∑ (EFGH)IJFKL M 	  	  where	  𝑅O 	  =	  Return	  for	  the	  period	  t,	  𝜇	  =	  the	  mean	  of	  T	  returns	  and	  T	  =	  the	  number	  or	  periods.	  	  When	  investor	  is	  creating	  his	  or	  her	  portfolio,	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  portfolio	  has	  a	  large	  role.	   The	   nonsystematic	   risk	   decreases	   through	   diversification	   and	   portfolio	  volatility	   should	   continue	   to	   fall.	   Portfolio	   risk	   is	   measured	   by	   variance,	   which	  shows	   how	   much	   uncertainty	   there	   is	   in	   portfolio	   returns.	   The	   variance	   of	   the	  portfolio	   is	   a	  weighted	   sum	  of	   covariance,	   and	   each	  weight	   is	   the	   amount	   of	   the	  portfolio	  proportions	  of	  the	  pair	  of	  assets	  in	  the	  covariance	  term.	  (Bodie	  et	  al.	  2014.)	  The	  variance	  of	  a	  e.g.	  two–asset	  portfolio	  can	  be	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  	  (4)	   	   𝑉𝑎𝑟:𝑅;< = 𝑤R7𝜎R7 + 𝑤T7𝜎T7 + 2𝑤R𝑤T𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟R, 𝑟T)	  	  where	  𝜎R7	  =	  Variance	  of	  the	  returns	  for	  asset	  D,	  𝜎T7	  =	  Variance	  of	  the	  returns	  for	  asset	  E,	  𝑤R 	  =	  Weight	  of	   the	  portfolio	  allocated	   to	  asset	  D,	  𝑤T 	  =	  Weight	  of	   the	  portfolio	  allocated	   to	  asset	  E	  and	  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟R, 𝑟T)	  =	  Covariance	  between	   the	   returns	  of	   the	   two	  assets.	  	  	  5.2.	  Capital	  asset	  pricing	  model	  (CAPM)	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  known	  models	  in	  finance	  is	  the	  capital	  asset	  pricing	  model	  (CAPM).	  The	  CAPM	  was	  introduced	  by	  Jack	  Treynor	  (1961),	  William	  Sharpe	  (1964),	  John	  Lintner	  (1965)	  and	  Jan	  Mossin	  (1966).	  The	  works	  by	  these	  academics	  broaden	  the	  work	  of	  Harry	  Markowitz	  (1952).	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Bodie	  et	  al.	  (2014:	  304)	  listed	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  CAPM:	  	   1.   Investors	  are	  rational	  mean–variance	  optimizers.	  2.   Investors	   planning	   horizon	   is	   a	   single	   period	   and	   they	   have	  homogeneous	  expectations.	  	  3.   All	   assets	   are	   publicly	  held	   and	   trade	   on	   public	   exchanges,	   short	  positions	   are	   permitted,	   and	   investors	   can	   borrow	   or	   lend	   at	   a	  common	  risk–free	  rate.	  4.   All	  information	  is	  publicly	  available	  and	  there	  are	  no	  transactions	  costs	  or	  taxes	  in	  the	  market.	  	  Theoretically	  only	  systematic	  risk	  determines	  expected	  return	  since	  unsystematic	  risk	   can	   be	   excluded	   with	   diversification.	   The	   CAPM	   gives	   a	   prediction	   of	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   risk	   of	   an	   asset	   and	   its	   expected	   return.	   It	   provides	   a	  benchmark	   rate	   of	   return	   for	   examining	   possible	   investments.	   It	   also	   gives	   an	  approximation	  to	  the	  expected	  return	  on	  assets	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  traded	  in	  the	  market.	   Although	   the	  model	   does	   not	   completely	  withstand	   empirical	   tests,	   it	   is	  broadly	   used	   due	   to	   the	   insight	   it	   offers	   and	   because	   its	   accuracy	   is	   deemed	  acceptable	  for	  important	  applications.	  (Bodie	  et	  al.	  2014:	  291.)	  	  (5)	   	   𝐸(𝑟?) = 𝑟X + 𝛽?[𝐸(𝑟[) − 𝑟X]	  	  where	  𝐸(𝑟?)	  =	  Expected	  return,	  𝑟X	  =	  Risk–free	  rate,	  𝛽? 	  =	  Beta	  of	  the	  stock	  I	  and	  𝐸(𝑟[)	  =	  Expected	  return	  of	  the	  market.	  	  	  5.3.	  Arbitrage	  pricing	  theory	  (APT)	  	  The	  arbitrage	  pricing	  theory	  (APT)	  was	  created	  by	  Ross	  (1976).	  It	  is	  a	  one	  period	  model	  in	  which	  every	  investor	  believes	  that	  the	  hypothetical	  properties	  of	  capital	  securities	  returns	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  factor	  structure.	  	  Ross	  (1976)	  argues	  that	  if	  equilibrium	  prices	  offer	  no	  arbitrage	  chances,	   then	  the	  expected	  returns	  on	  these	  capital	  securities	  are	  roughly	   linearly	  related	  to	  the	   factor	   loadings.	  The	  APT	  is	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  CAPM	  in	  that	  both	  maintain	  a	  linear	  relation	  between	  securities	  expected	   returns	   and	   their	   covariances	   with	   other	   random	   variables.	   These	  covariances	  are	  explained	  as	  measures	  of	  risks,	  which	  an	  investor	  cannot	  avoid,	  by	  diversification.	  The	  slope	  coefficients	  of	  the	  linear	  relation	  between	  the	  covariances	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and	   expected	   returns	   are	   explained	   as	   risk	   premium.	   (Huberman	   1989:	   72.)	  Mathematically	  the	  APT	  can	  be	  shown	  (Copeland,	  Weston	  and	  Shastri	  2005:	  176):	  	  (6)	   	   𝑟 = 𝑟? + 𝑏?6𝐹6 + 𝑏?7𝐹7 + ⋯+ 𝑏?@𝐹@ +∈?	  	  where,	  𝑟 	  =	  The	   random	   rate	   of	   return	   of	   the	   ith	   asset,	  𝑟? 	  =	  The	   expected	   rate	   of	  return	  of	  the	  ith	  asset,	  𝑏?@	  =	  The	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  return	  of	  the	  ith	  to	  the	  kth	  factor,	  𝐹6	  =	  The	  mean	  zero	  kth	  factor	  common	  to	  the	  returns	  of	  all	  assets,	  ∈? 	  =	  A	  random	  zero	  mean	  noise	  term	  for	  the	  ith	  asset.	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6.	  DATA	  AND	  METHODOLOGY	  	  This	   chapter	   begins	   with	   presenting	   the	   research	   hypotheses	   followed	   by	  introduction	   on	   the	   data	   used	   in	   the	   study.	   The	   last	   subchapter	   presents	   the	  methodologies	  used	  in	  the	  study	  to	  achieve	  the	  empirical	  results	  that	  are	  explained	  in	  the	  chapter	  seven.	  	  	  6.1.	  Research	  hypotheses	  	  In	   previous	   studies,	   the	   risk–adjusted	   return	   of	   the	   DoD	   strategies	   has	   been	  questionable;	   however,	   previous	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   DoD	   strategies	   create	  abnormal	  returns.	  Since	  investors	  and	  researchers	  always	  try	  to	  figure	  out	  ways	  to	  defeat	  market	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  is:	  	   H6:	  The	  DoD	  portfolios’	  returns	  exceed	  the	  market	  return	  on	  both	  risk–adjusted	  and	  absolute	  bases.	  	  Since	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  have	  to	  be	  rebalanced	  yearly	  it	  creates	  higher	  transaction	  costs	   and	   also	   tax–adjustment	   is	   needed.	   After	   the	   transaction	   costs	   and	   tax–adjustments	  DoD	  portfolios	  returns	  will	  certainly	  decrease.	  Therefore,	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  is:	  	   H7:	  The	  DoD	  portfolios’	  returns	  exceed	  the	  market	  return	  after	  	  transaction	  costs	  and	  tax–adjustments.	  	  The	   time	   period	   of	   years	   2001	   to	   2017	   used	   in	   this	   study	   includes:	   the	   global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008,	  and	  the	  years	  of	  2001	  and	  2002	  when	  the	  9/11	  terrorist	  attack,	   the	   internet	   bubble	   bursting	   and	   U.S.	   dollar´s	   decline	   against	   the	   euro	  occurred	  leading	  the	  S&P	  500	  index	  to	  being	  negative.	  Since	  a	  lot	  of	  high	  dividend	  yield	   companies	   also	   qualify	   as	   value	   companies,	   by	   having	   high	  B/M	   ratios	   and	  relatively	  stable	  cash	  flows,	  their	  performance	  during	  market	  downturns	  has	  been	  interesting	   topic	   to	   analyze.	   Investors	   could	  define	   high	   dividend	  payments	   as	   a	  signal	   of	   lower	   risk	   or	   as	   a	   buffer	   to	   the	   declining	   stock	   price	   during	   market	  downturn.	  Although	  the	  stock	  prices	  decline,	  the	  high	  dividend	  yield	  firms	  usually	  have	  more	  buffers	  to	  maintain	  the	  ongoing	  dividend	  levels	  and	  distribute	  cash	  flow	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to	   their	   shareholders	   even	   during	   market	   downturns.	   Therefore,	   the	   third	  hypothesis	  will	  be:	  	   H8:	  The	  DoD	  portfolios	  outperform	  index	  in	  market	  downturns.	  	  	  6.2.	  Data	  	  In	  the	  study,	  research	  data	  covers	  the	  period	  from	  January	  2001	  to	  December	  2017.	  The	   aim	   of	   the	   research	   is	   to	   empirically	   analyze	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   DoD	  strategy	  against	  the	  S&P	  500	  index.	  Data	  for	  the	  S&P	  500	  companies	  and	  dividend	  yields	  are	  obtained	  from	  the	  database	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Vaasa.	  Other	  data,	  such	  as	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  and	  stocks	  closing	  prices	  are	  obtained	  from	  Yahoo	  Finance.	  	  	  Since	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  are	  made	  from	  as	  large	  index	  as	  S&P	  500,	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  different	  companies,	  compared	  to	  some	  of	  the	  previous	  studies,	  which	  have	  been	  conducted	  from	  smaller	  markets.	  Companies,	  which	  are	  in	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  are	  mostly	  large	  or	  mid	  cap	  companies	  on	  consumer	  cyclical	  or	  utility	  areas.	  Since	  in	  the	  S&P	  500	  are	  only	  large	  cap	  companies,	  the	  mid	  and	  small	  cap	  companies	  found	  in	  the	   DoD	   portfolios	   have	   usually	   dropped	   temporally	   out	   from	   the	   index	   after	  decreasing	   in	  market	  capitalization,	  or	   just	  being	  temporally	  smaller.	  Companies’	  stocks	   are	   mainly	   exchanged	   in	   NYSE	   and	   rest	   in	   NASDAQ.	   To	   avoid	   mergers,	  survival	  bias	  or	  other	  skewing	  effects	  for	  the	  DoD	  portfolios’	  stocks,	  all	  the	  portfolios	  have	  been	  checked	  that	  the	  stocks	  are	  in	  the	  S&P	  500	  index	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  asset	  allocation	  year.	  	  	  6.3.	  Methodology	  	  The	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  was	  made	  by	  standard	  DoD	  portfolio	  construction	  way	  first	  introduced	  by	  John	  Slatter	  (Dorfman	  1988):	  	  	   1.   On	   the	   last	   trading	  day	  of	   the	  year,	   the	  dividend	  yields	  of	   all	   the	  stocks	  in	  the	  S&P	  500	  index	  are	  calculated.	  2.   After	  that,	  the	  dividend	  yields	  are	  ranked	  to	  order	  and	  the	  top	  10	  dividend	   yield	   stocks	   are	   identified,	   and	   an	   equally	   weighted	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portfolio	  of	  the	  top	  10	  stocks	  is	  made,	  and	  the	  portfolio	  is	  held	  for	  one	  year.	  3.   After	  one	  year,	  the	  list	  is	  rebalanced	  and	  the	  stocks	  which	  are	  not	  in	  the	  top	  10	  anymore	  will	  be	  sold	  and	  those	  which	  are	  in	  top	  10	  are	  bought,	  so	  that	  in	  the	  portfolio,	  there	  is	  10	  stocks	  in	  equal	  amounts.	  	  4.   The	  steps	  1–3	  were	  repeated	  for	  17	  times.	  	  	  To	  test	  the	  DoD–5	  strategy	  (also	  known	  as	  PoD)	  the	  same	  procedures	  were	  made,	  except	  with	  only	  the	  top	  five	  highest	  dividend	  yielding	  stocks	  of	  the	  DoD	  strategy,	  which	  are	  also	  the	  five	  cheapest	  ones.	  Furthermore,	  to	  test	  the	  DoD–1	  strategy	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  PPP)	  the	  second	  least	  expensive	  stock	  from	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  was	  chosen	   each	   year.	   Finally,	   to	   test	   how	   the	   DoD	   portfolios	   perform	   in	   market	  downturns,	  the	  years	  when	  S&P	  500	  returns	  were	  negative	  were	  chosen	  from	  the	  data,	  and	  tested	  how	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  returns	  were	  compared	  to	  the	  index.	  	  	  The	   time–series	   data	   used	   in	   the	   study	   comprises	  of	  monthly	   and	   yearly	   closing	  prices	  of	  individual	  stocks	  and	  S&P	  500	  index.	  All	  the	  cash	  dividends	  by	  companies	  in	   the	  DoD	  portfolios	  are	   reinvested	  when	  calculating	   the	  annual	   returns	   for	   the	  portfolio.	  	  Next	  step	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  DoD	  strategies	  performance	  is	  to	  find	  out	  how	  DoD	  portfolios	   cope	   against	   S&P	   500.	   The	   market–adjusted	   model	   can	   be	   used	   to	  measure	  the	  abnormal	  returns:	  	  (7)	   	   𝐴𝑅cd = 𝑅ReR − 𝑅c	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  done	  by	  Rinne	  and	  Vähämaa	   (2011),	  also	  the	  M7	  or	   ‘Modigliani–squared’	  adjustment	  is	  calculated	  as	  second	  measure	  of	  abnormal	  performance.	  The	  M7	  was	  firstly	  proposed	  by	  Modigliani	  and	  Modigliani	  (1997):	  	  (8)	   	   𝐴𝑅c7 = (𝑅ReR − 𝑅g) hihjkj − (𝑅c − 𝑅g)	  	  where	  𝑅ReR 	  =	  Return	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolio,	  𝑅g	  =	  Risk–free	  interest	  rate,	  𝑅c	  =	  Return	  of	  
market,	  𝜎𝑀	  =	  Volatility	  of	  market	  and	  𝜎𝐷𝑜𝐷	  =	  Volatility	  of	  DoD	  portfolio	  	  In	  addition	  to	  abnormal	  returns,	  also	  the	  risk–adjusted	  returns	  will	  be	  calculated.	  Like	   in	  previous	  DoD	  studies,	   the	  Sharpe	  ratio	  and	  Treynor	   index	  will	  be	  used	  to	  
	   46	  
analyze	  the	  risk–adjusted	  performance	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolio.	  The	  Sharpe	  ratio	  shows	  portfolio	  returns	  to	  total	  risk	  and	  is	  calculated	  as:	  	  (9)	   	   𝑆m = EnoEpqn 	  	  where	  𝑅m 	  =	  Expected	   return	   of	   the	   portfolio,	  𝑅g 	  =	  Risk–free	   interest	   rate	  and	  𝜎𝑃	  =	  Standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  portfolio	  	  The	   second	   risk–adjusted	  measurement	   is	   Treynor	   index,	  which	   shows	  portfolio	  returns	  to	  systematic	  risk	  and	  is	  calculated	  as:	  	  (10)	   	   𝑇m = EnGEptn 	  	  where	  𝑅m 	  =	  Expected	   return	   of	   the	   portfolio,	  𝑅g 	  =	  Risk–free	   interest	   rate	  and	  𝛽𝑃 	  =	  Beta	  of	  the	  portfolio	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7.	  EMPIRICAL	  RESULTS	  	  Empirical	  results	  include	  the	  performance	  of	  DoD–10,	  DoD–5	  and	  DoD–1	  portfolios.	  First,	   the	   DoD–10	   portfolio	   performance	  will	   be	   presented	   in	   both	   absolute	   and	  risk–adjusted	  basis,	  with	  Sharpe	  ratio	  and	  Treynor	  index,	  and	  transaction	  costs	  and	  taxes	  will	  be	  added.	  Secondly,	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  performance	  will	  be	  presented	  with	  same	  factors	  than	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio.	  The	  DoD–5	  is	  like	  the	  DoD–10,	  except	  it	  has	  from	  the	  top	  10	  dividend	  yielding	  stocks	  only	  the	  five	  cheapest	  ones.	  Thirdly,	  the	   DoD–1	   portfolio	   performance	   is	   showed	   with	   same	   factors	   than	   previous	  portfolios.	  The	  DoD–1	  portfolio	  consists	  only	  of	  one	  stock,	  i.e.	  the	  second	  cheapest	  stock,	  from	  top	  10	  dividend	  yielding	  stocks.	  The	  last	  subchapter	  analyzes	  how	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  cope	  against	  market	  downturns.	  	  	  	  7.1.	  The	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  performance	  	  Table	  3	  reports	  the	  one–year	  buy–and–hold	  returns	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  and	  the	  equivalent	  returns	  for	  the	  S&P	  500	  index.	  The	  periods	  for	  the	  returns	  are	  from	  the	  year	  2001	  to	  the	  year	  2017.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  Table	  3,	  the	  mean	  annual	  return	  for	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  is	  23.8	  %,	  and	  for	  the	  S&P500	  index	  it	  is	  7.9	  %,	  which	  is	  significantly	  lower.	  Median	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  is	  31	  %,	  which	  is	  also	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  S&P	  500	  index’s	  11.8	  %.	  The	  reported	  maximum	  (141.9	  %)	  and	  minimum	  (–49.1	   %)	   for	   the	   DoD–10	   shows	   that	   the	   strategy	   has	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	  movement	  yearly	  compared	  to	  index	  maximum	  (32.1	  %)	  and	  minimum	  (–36.6	  %).	  Table	  3	  also	  shows	  that	  the	  index	  had	  more	  positive	  years	  during	  the	  sample	  period	  with	  14	  out	  of	  17,	  whereas	  the	  DoD–10	  had	  13	  out	  of	  17.	  When	  portfolio	  includes	  only	  10	  stocks,	  it	  is	  of	  course	  a	  lot	  riskier,	  since	  there	  is	  not	  much	  diversification,	  which	  increases	  the	  portfolio’s	  systematic	  risk	  higher	  than	  the	  index.	  Therefore,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  DoD–10	  has	  a	  lot	  higher	  standard	  deviation	  than	  the	  index	  (39.4	  %	  compared	  to	  17.9	  %).	  	  	  For	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   returns,	   the	   t–statistic	   is	   employed	   to	   find	   out	   the	  difference	   between	   returns	   and	   zero.	   The	   t–test	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   DoD–10	  returns	  differs	  from	  zero	  at	  the	  0.05	  level	  being	  statistically	  significant,	  since	  the	  p–value	  is	  0.024	  and	  the	  index	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  0.1	  level	  with	  the	  p–value	  0.088,	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  0.05	  level.	  However,	  when	  the	  sample	  size	  is	  so	  small,	  annual	  returns	  should	  be	  interpreted	  with	  some	  caution.	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  The	  ARwx 	  is	  15.9	  %,	  which	  shows	  that	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  has	  created	  abnormal	  returns	  with	   the	  market–adjustment	  model	   and	   the	  ARw7 	  is	   14.6	  %,	  which	   also	  indicates	  that	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  has	  beaten	  the	  index	  with	  the	  M7–adjustment.	  However,	  the	  mean	  returns	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  a	  two–tailed	  test	  at	  the	  0.05	  level,	  but	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level	  (p–value	  of	  0.063	  for	  the	  ARwx 	  and	  0.057	  for	  the	  ARw7).	  Table	  3	  shows	  that	  the	  ARwx 	  outperformed	  the	  index	  10	  out	  of	  17	  years	  and	  the	  ARw7 	  9	  out	  of	  17	  years.	  	  	  	  
Table	  3.	  Annual	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio.	  	  
Year         DoD–10       S&P  500       𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀       𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
2001   0.414   –0.118   0.532   0.868  
2002   0.163   –0.220   0.382   0.581  
2003   0.393   0.284   0.110   0.109  
2004   0.310   0.107   0.203   0.127  
2005   0.052   0.048   0.004   0.004  
2006   0.360   0.156   0.204   0.183  
2007   –0.018   0.055     –0.073   –0.107  
2008   –0.491   –0.366   –0.125   –0.148  
2009   1.419   0.259   1.160   0.276  
2010   0.341   0.148   0.193   0.198  
2011   0.093   0.021   0.072   0.199  
2012   0.102   0.159   –0.057   0.012  
2013   0.475   0.321   0.154   0.081  
2014   0.338   0.135   0.203   0.490  
2015   –0.155   0.014     –0.169   –0.164  
2016   0.315   0.118   0.197   0.097  
2017   –0.071   0.218   –0.289   –0.329  
Mean   0.238   0.079   0.159   0.146  
t–statistic   2.489   1.819   1.996   2.052  
p–value   0.024   0.088   0.063   0.057  
Median   0.310   0.118   0.154   0.109  
Minimum   –0.491   –0.366   –0.289   –0.329  
Maximum   1.419   0.321   1.160   0.868  
Standard  deviation   0.394   0.179   0.328   0.293  
No.  of  positive  periods   13   14   12   13  
No.  of  observations   17   17   17   17  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   0.190      0.111   0.098  
t–statistic   1.987      1.393   1.373  
p–value   0.064      0.183   0.189  
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  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  annual	  return	  of	  the	  DoD–10	  and	  S&P	  500.	  The	  figure	  visually	  demonstrates	  during	  which	  years	  the	  DoD–10	  outperformed	  the	  market	  and	  vice	  versa.	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strategy	  even	  on	  monthly	  basis.	  Out	  of	  204	  possible	  months,	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  outperformed	  the	  index	  with	  ARwx 	  114	  times	  and	  with	  ARw7 	  119	  times.	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  4.	  Monthly	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio.	  	  
	  7.1.1.	  Transaction	  and	  tax	  costs	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  	  Table	  3	  shows	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  cost	  adjusted	  return	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  to	  be	  19	  %.	  It	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level,	  but	  it	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level	  (p–value	  0.064).	  The	  adjusted	  return	  means	  are	  respectively	  ARwx 	  11.1	  %	  (p–value	  0.183)	  and	  ARw7 	  9.8	  %	  (p–value	  0.189),	  neither	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  conventional	  level.	  The	  DoD–strategy	  requires	  a	  lot	  of	  annual	  rebalancing	  due	  to	  the	  changes	  of	  highest	  dividend	  yielding	  stocks	  in	  the	  S&P	  500.	  A	  similar	  approach	  to	   transaction	   costs	   and	   taxes	   as	   Rinne	   and	   Vähämaa	   (2011)	   employed	   is	   also	  employed	   in	  this	  present	  research.	  The	  DoD	  strategy	  requires	  quite	  much	  annual	  rebalancing,	  no	  matter,	  if	  the	  portfolio	  includes	  the	  top	  10	  dividend	  yield	  stocks	  or	  just	  one	  stock	  of	  the	  top	  10.	  Table	  5	  shows	  how	  the	  transaction	  costs	  for	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  were	  determined.	  Over	  the	  time	  period	  from	  2001	  to	  2017,	  an	  average	  of	  5.35	   stocks	   had	   to	   be	   replaced	   annually	   in	   the	   DoD–10	   portfolio.	   In	   the	   DoD–5	  portfolio,	  3.61	  stocks	  had	  to	  be	  replaced	  annually	  (0.722	  *	  5	  stocks)	  and	  in	  the	  DoD–1	  the	  amount	  was	  0.94	  stocks	  annually.	  A	  2.5	  %	  round–term	  per	  annum	  transaction	  cost	  was	  assumed	  through	  previous	  studies,	  where	  the	  cost	  has	  varied	  from	  1	  %	  to	  3	  %,	  which	  totals	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  as	  1.3	  %	  annual	  transaction	  cost,	  for	  the	  
             DoD–10         S&P  500       𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀       𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
Mean   0.016   0.004   0.012   0.012  
t–statistic   3.451   1.495   3.207   3.345  
p–value   0.001   0.136   0.002   0.001  
Median   0.016   0.010   0.006   0.007  
Minimum   –0.228   –0.169   –0.131   –0.176  
Maximum   0.486   0.108   0.392   0.165  
Standard  deviation   0.232   0.143   0.182   0.051  
No.  of  positive  periods   135   127   114   119  
No.  of  observations   204   204   204   204  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   0.012      0.008   0.008  
t–statistic   2.586      2.113   2.223  
p–value   0.010      0.036   0.027  
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DoD–5	  portfolio	  1.8	  %	  annual	  transaction	  cost	  and	  for	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio	  2.4	  %	  annual	  transaction	  cost.	  	  	  	  
Table	  5.	  Transaction	  costs	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios.	  	  
   DoD–10   DoD–5   DoD–1  
        1      Turnover  rate   0.535   0.722   0.941  
2      Round–term  transaction  cost   0.025   0.025   0.025  
3   1*2   Transaction  cost  of  new  stocks  rebalancing   0.013   0.018   0.024  	  In	  addition	  to	  transaction	  costs,	  investors	  have	  to	  pay	  income	  and	  capital	  gains	  taxes.	  Tax	  policy	  in	  the	  U.S.	  has	  had	  some	  changes	  during	  the	  time	  period	  from	  2001	  to	  2017.	  On	  average,	  the	  numbers	  are	  15	  %	  for	  the	  annual	  tax	  rate	  on	  dividends,	  and	  25	   %	   on	   capital	   gains.	   Therefore,	   those	   two	   percentages	   were	   used	   in	   the	  calculations	  to	   find	  out	   the	  tax	  costs	   for	   the	  DoD	  portfolios	   in	   the	  Table	  6.	  Lower	  percentage	   for	  dividends	  creates	  advantage	   for	   the	  DoD	  investors,	  since	  dividend	  returns	  are	  the	  heart	  of	   the	  strategy.	  Table	  6	  demonstrates	  with	  annual	   turnover	  rate	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  being	  0.535,	  average	  annual	  tax	  rate	  on	  dividend	  0.15,	  average	  annual	  tax	  rate	  on	  capital	  gains	  0.25,	  annual	  return	  mean	  for	  the	  DoD	  0.238	  and	  dividend	  yield	  for	  the	  DoD	  0.076	  can	  be	  calculated	  that	  total	  annual	  tax	  on	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  is	  3.5	  %.	  For	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio,	  it	  is	  significantly	  higher	  6.2	  %	  and	  for	  the	  DoD–1	  over	  two	  times	  higher	  13.4	  %.	  When	  combining	  transaction	  and	  tax	  costs,	  it	  can	  be	  stated	  that	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  total	  costs	  per	  annum	  are	  4.8	  %,	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  8	  %	  and	  for	  the	  DoD–1	  highest	  15.8	  %.	  	  	  	  
Table	  6.	  Tax	  costs	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios.	  	  
   DoD–10   DoD–5   DoD–1  
1      Annual  DoD  turnover  rate   0.535   0.722   0.941  
2      Average  annual  tax  rate  on  dividend   0.150   0.150   0.150  
3      Average  annual  tax  rate  on  capital  gains   0.250   0.250   0.250  
4      Annual  return  mean  for  DoD   0.238   0.294   0.435  
5      Dividend  yield  for  DoD     0.076   0.079   0.079  
6   4–5   Capital  appreciation  average  for  DoD     0.162   0.216   0.356  
7   1*2*6   Average  annual  tax  rate  on  dividend  of  DoD       0.013   0.023   0.050  
8   1*3*6   Average  annual  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  of  DoD     0.022   0.039   0.084  
9      Total  annual  tax  on  DoD     0.035   0.062   0.134  
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  7.1.2.	  Risk–adjustment	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  	  To	  find	  out	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  performance	  on	  risk–adjusted	  basis,	  Sharpe	  ratio	  and	  Treynor	  index	  were	  employed.	  Table	  7	  shows	  the	  DoD–10	  and	  S&P	  500	  Sharpe	  ratios	  and	  Treynor	  indices	  from	  year	  2001	  to	  year	  2017.	  	  	  
Table	  7.	  Sharpe	  ratios	  and	  Treynor	  indices	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  and	  S&P	  500	  index.	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Table	  7	  shows	  how	  the	  DoD–10	  dominates	  the	  market	  index	  quite	  clearly	  on	  both	  panel	  A	  and	  panel	  B.	  Out	  of	  17	  years,	  the	  DoD–10	  had	  a	  larger	  Sharpe	  ratio	  in	  13	  years,	  accounting	  for	  76	  %	  in	  total.	  Highest	  Sharpe	  ratio	  was	  in	  year	  2014	  where	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  had	  2.970,	   and	  market’s	   largest	  Sharpe	   ratio	  was	   in	  year	  2013	  where	  it	  was	  2.121.	  The	  worst	  Sharpe	  ratios	  for	  both	  the	  DoD–10	  (–1.560)	  and	  S&P	  500	  (–0.970)	  were	  in	  year	  2008	  during	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  On	  average	  for	  the	  whole	   time	   period	   from	   2001	   to	   2017,	   the	   DoD–10	   Sharpe	   ratio	  was	   1.129	   and	  market	  index	  0.460.	  	  The	  panel	  B	  presents	  the	  Treynor	  index	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  and	  market	  index.	  Out	  of	  17	  years,	  the	  DoD–10	  had	  larger	  Treynor	  index	  in	  12	  years,	  accounting	  for	  71	  %	  in	  total.	  On	  average,	  the	  Treynor	  index	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  is	  0.328	  and	  for	  the	  market	  index	  0.046.	  Portfolio’s	  beta	  was	  on	  average	  0.995,	  at	  its	  lowest	  0.07	  during	  the	  year	  2002	   and	   highest	   2.36	   during	   the	   year	   2009.	   Beta	   numbers	   indicate	   that	   the	  movement	  of	  the	  portfolio	  is	  generally	  in	  the	  same	  direction	  as	  S&P	  500,	  yet	  still	  less	  than	  the	  S&P	  500.	  The	  level	  of	  systematic	  risk	  is	  lower	  in	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  than	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	  To	  conclude	  the	  DoD–10	  performance,	  the	  empirical	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  DoD–10	  is	  effective	  against	  the	  S&P500	  index.	  The	  time	  period	  of	  course	  plays	  a	  large	  role,	  since	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  took	  place	  within	  that	  time	  period,	  and	  as	  overall,	  the	  time	   period	   is	   rather	   short.	   Statistically	   the	   DoD–10	   annual	   mean	   return	   is	  significant,	  but	  after	  the	  market–adjustments	  it	  is	  only	  significant	  on	  the	  0.1	  level.	  When	  considering	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs,	  the	  DoD–10	  annual	  mean	  return	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level	  but	  after	  market–adjustments	  statistically	  not	  significant.	   On	   monthly	   basis,	   even	   after	   the	   market–adjustments,	   and	   tax	   and	  transaction	  costs,	  the	  mean	  results	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  are	  all	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  The	  numbers	  from	  the	  Table	  7	  illustrate	  that	  the	  DoD–10	  is	  rather	  effective	  against	  the	  S&P	  500	  index	  after	  risk–adjustments.	  	  	  	  7.2.	  The	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  performance	  	  The	  DoD–5	  strategy	  has	  been	  studied	  in	  many	  of	  the	  same	  articles	  where	  the	  DoD–10	   strategy	   has	   been	   under	   the	   scope.	   For	   instance,	   Lin	   (2017)	   and	   Rinne	   and	  Vähämaa	   (2011)	   investigated	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   DoD–5	   strategy.	   Table	   8	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demonstrates	   the	   annual	   returns	   of	   the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	   and	   the	   S&P	  500	   index	  during	  the	  time	  period	  from	  2001	  to	  2017.	  	  	  	  
Table	  8.	  Annual	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio.	  	  
Year               DoD–5         S&P  500   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
2001   0.589   –0.118   0.707   1.017  
2002   0.184   –0.220   0.404   0.615  
2003   0.451   0.284   0.168   0.028  
2004   0.275   0.107   0.167   0.110  
2005   0.037   0.048   –0.012   –0.011  
2006   0.306   0.156   0.150   0.080  
2007   –0.025   0.055     –0.080   –0.086  
2008   –0.400   –0.366   –0.034   –0.083  
2009   2.221   0.259   1.962   0.458  
2010   0.364   0.148   0.216   0.150  
2011   0.059   0.021   0.038   0.089  
2012   0.081   0.159   –0.078   –0.019  
2013   0.822   0.321   0.501   0.200  
2014   0.236   0.135   0.101   0.288  
2015   –0.257   0.014     –0.271   –0.144  
2016   0.270   0.118   0.153   0.040  
2017   –0.209   0.218   –0.427   –0.360  
Mean   0.294   0.079   0.216   0.139  
t–statistic   2.083   1.819   1.694   1.802  
p–value   0.054   0.088   0.110   0.090  
Median   0.236   0.118   0.150   0.080  
Minimum   –0.400   –0.366   –0.427   –0.360  
Maximum   2.221   0.321   1.962   1.017  
Standard  deviation   0.583   0.179   0.525   0.319  
No.  of  positive  periods   13   14   11   11  
No.  of  observations   17   17   17   17  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   0.214      0.135   0.059  
t–statistic   1.514      1.063   0.762  
p–value   0.150      0.304   0.457  	  Table	  8	  shows	  that	   the	  DoD–5	  portfolio’s	  mean	  return	  is	  29.4	  %,	  with	  p–value	  of	  0.054.	   The	   market–adjusted	   return	   is	   quite	   high	   being	   21.6	   %,	   thus	   it	   is	   not	  statistically	   significant	   (p–value	   0.110).	   The	  M7–adjusted	   return	   is	   13.9	  %	  being	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statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level	  (p–value	  0.090).	  The	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  strategy	   is	   high	   being	   58.3	   %,	   which	   is	   understandable	   when	   the	   portfolio	   is	  including	  only	   five	  stocks.	  The	  DoD–5	  highest	  return	  was	  222.1	  %	   from	   the	  year	  2009	  right	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  worst	  year	  was	  2008	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis	  with	  –40	  %	  return.	  The	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  had	  13	  out	  of	  17	  positive	  periods,	  when	  the	  index	  had	  14	  out	  of	  17.	  The	  DoD–5	  outperformed	  the	  index	  11	  years	  out	  of	  17,	  accounting	  for	  65	  %.	  After	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio’s	  mean	  return	  was	  21.4	  %,	  market–adjusted	  return	  being	  13.5	  %	  and	  M7–adjusted	  return	  being	  5.9	  %,	  all	  statistically	  not	  significant.	  	  	  Figure	  2	  shows	  the	  annual	  return	  of	  the	  DoD–5	  compared	  to	  S&P	  500.	  The	  figure	  2	  displays	  that	  even	  the	  DoD–5	  outperformed	  the	   index	  11	  out	  of	  17	  observations,	  only	  the	  years	  2001,	  2009	  and	  2013	  shows	  more	  large	  differences	  with	  the	  strategy	  and	  index	  performance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Annual	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  and	  S&P	  500	  index.	  	  Next,	  the	  monthly	  returns	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  are	  analyzed.	  The	  Table	  9	  illustrates	  that	  the	  monthly	  mean	  returns	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  is	  1.9	  %	  compared	  to	  the	  index	  0.4	  %	  or	  to	  the	  DoD–10	  that	  is	  1.6	  %.	  The	  monthly	  mean	  return	  is	  statistically	  significant	  with	  the	  p–value	  0.001	  and	  even	  after	  the	  market–adjusted	  returns	  1.4	  %	  and	  1.2	  %	  both	  are	  statistically	  significant	  (p–value	  0.003	  and	  0.000),	  which	  suggests	  that	  the	  DoD–
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5	  outperforms	  the	  market.	  The	  median	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  is	  1.5	  %	  and	  the	  worst	  return	  is	  –22.6	  %	  while	  the	  best	  month	  produced	  55.2	  %	  return.	  The	  mean	  return	  of	  the	  DoD–5	  after	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs	  is	  1.2	  %	  and	  statistically	  significant	  with	  p–value	   of	   0.036.	   After	   the	   tax	   and	   transaction	   costs	   the	   DoD–5	   still	   is	   able	   to	  outperform	  the	  market	  by	  0.8	  %,	  but	  not	  being	  statistically	  significant.	  	  	  	  
Table	  9.	  Monthly	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio.	  	  
                     DoD–5           S&P  500   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
Mean   0.019   0.004   0.014   0.012  
t–statistic   3.307   1.495   3.040   3.954  
p–value   0.001   0.136   0.003   0.000  
Median   0.015   0.010   0.010   0.008  
Minimum   –0.226   –0.169   –0.148   –0.170  
Maximum   0.552   0.108   0.458   0.161  
Standard  deviation   0.278   0.143   0.231   0.045  
No.  of  positive  periods   126   127   118   124  
No.  of  observations   204   204   204   204  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   0.012      0.008   0.006  
t–statistic   2.106      1.599   1.817  




Figure	  3.	  Annual	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  and	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio.	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  Figure	  3	  shows	  the	  differences	  in	  annual	  returns	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  and	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio.	  Since,	  both	  of	  the	  portfolios	  were	  able	  to	  outperform	  the	  market,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  compare	  how	  the	  two	  strategies	  performed	  against	  each	  other.	  	  	  Next,	  the	  performance	  of	  DoD–5	  is	  tested	  by	  using	  the	  risk–adjustments.	  The	  same	  risk–adjustments	  will	  be	  used	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  and	  the	  DoD–10.	  Table	  10	  shows	  the	  DoD–5	  and	  S&P	  500	  Sharpe	  ratios	  and	  Treynor	  indices	  from	  year	  2001	  to	  year	  2017.	  	  	  
Table	  10.	  Sharpe	  ratios	  and	  Treynor	  indices	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  and	  S&P	  500	  index.	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  Table	  10	  shows	  that	  DoD–5	  dominates	  the	  market	  index	  in	  both	  Sharpe	  ratios	  and	  in	  Treynor	  indices.	  The	  panel	  A	  shows	  that	  the	  DoD–5	  has	  higher	  Sharpe	  ratio	  in	  13	  out	  of	  17	  observations,	  which	  totals	  to	  76	  %.	  Mean	  for	  the	  DoD–5	  Sharpe	  ratio	  is	  0.994	  and	  median	  1.400.	  	  	  The	  panel	  B	  shows	  that	  the	  DoD–5	  has	  higher	  Treynor	  index	  in	  11	  out	  of	  17	  years,	  which	  sums	  up	  to	  65	  %.	  The	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  beta	  was	  on	  average	  1.137	  through	  the	  time	  period	  of	  from	  2000	  to	  2017.	  Beta	  indicates	  that	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  moves	  rather	  the	  same	  way	  as,	  however	  little	  bit	  more,	  than	  the	  market	  index.	  The	  level	  of	  systematic	  risk	  is	  higher	  in	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  than	  in	  the	  market.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   the	   DoD–5	   portfolio	   outperformed	   the	   market	   index	   measured	   in	  annually	  and	  monthly	  basis.	  In	  annual	  mean	  returns	  none	  are	  statistical	  significant	  in	  the	  0.05	  level,	  but	  in	  the	  0.1	  level	  annual	  return	  of	  29.4	  %	  and	  M7–adjusted	  return	  13.9	  %	   are	   both	   statistically	   significant.	   After	   the	   tax	   and	   transaction	   costs,	   the	  returns	   are	   still	   high	   but	   none	   are	   statistically	   significant.	   Monthly	   returns	   are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level	  and	  after	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs	  the	  mean	  monthly	  return	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level	  and	  M7–adjusted	  return	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level.	  The	  risk–adjustments	  also	  indicates	  that	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  copes	  well	  against	   the	  S&P	  500.	   It	  can	  be	  stated	  that	   the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  is	  effective	  against	  the	  market	  index.	  	  	  7.3.	  The	  DoD–1	  portfolio	  performance	  	  In	  the	  DoD–1	  strategy	  only	  one	  stock,	  the	  second	  least	  expensive	  from	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  is	  chosen.	  The	  idea	  for	  not	  picking	  the	  cheapest	  one	  is	  to	  avoid	  a	  company,	  which	   potentially	   has	   financial	   issues,	   as	   the	   stock	   price	   might	   go	   skyrocketing	  down.	  It	  is	  not	  ordinary	  or	  even	  recommended	  to	  choose	  just	  one	  stock	  of	  the	  whole	  index	  and	  invest	  to	  it,	  therefore	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio	  strategy	  must	  be	  analyzed	  with	  caution.	  O’Higgins	  and	  Downes	  (1991)	  found	  that	  the	  DoD–1	  performed	  even	  better	  than	  the	  DoD–5	  against	  the	  DJIA.	  	  	  Table	   11	   shows	   the	   annual	   returns	   for	   the	  DoD–1	  portfolio.	   The	  mean	   return	   is	  staggering	  43.5	  %,	  hence	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  However,	  the	  median	  is	  17.5	  %,	  which	  is	  smaller	  than	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio’s	  23.6	  %	  or	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio’s	  31	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%.	  After	  the	  M7–adjustment	  the	  mean	  return	  drops	  heavily	  due	  to	  the	  high	  volatility	  of	  the	  portfolio.	  The	  standard	  deviation	  of	  116.8	  %	  shows	  that	  the	  DoD–1	  has	  a	  lot	  of	   systematic	   risk	   compared	   to	   the	   market	   index,	   or	   compared	   to	   the	   DoD–10	  portfolio’s	  39.4	  %	  and	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio’s	  58.3	  %	  standard	  deviation.	  	  	  	  
Table	  11.	  Annual	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio.	  	  	  
Year             DoD–1       S&P  500   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
2001   0.449   –0.118   0.567   0.956  
2002   0.074   –0.220   0.294   0.302  
2003   –0.098   0.284   –0.381   –0.275  
2004   0.339   0.107   0.231   0.127  
2005   –0.016   0.048   –0.064   –0.044  
2006   0.381   0.156   0.225   0.163  
2007   0.033   0.055     –0.022   –0.022  
2008   –0.441   –0.366   –0.075   0.043  
2009   4.198   0.259   3.939   0.699  
2010   0.134   0.148   –0.014   –0.063  
2011   0.277   0.021   0.256   0.460  
2012   0.175   0.159   0.016   0.046  
2013   2.442   0.321   2.121   0.394  
2014   0.235   0.135   0.099   0.065  
2015   –0.701   0.014     –0.715   –0.169  
2016   0.191   0.118   0.073   –0.054  
2017   –0.275   0.218   –0.494   –0.270  
Mean   0.435   0.079   0.356   0.139  
t–statistic   1.536   1.819   1.335   1.719  
p–value   0.144   0.088   0.200   0.105  
Median   0.175   0.118   0.073   0.046  
Minimum   –0.701   –0.366   –0.715   –0.275  
Maximum   4.198   0.321   3.939   0.956  
Standard  deviation   1.168   0.179   1.100   0.333  
No.  of  positive  periods   12   14   10   10  
No.  of  observations   17   17   17   17  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   0.277      0.199   –0.019  
t–statistic   0.979      0.744   –0.237  
p–value   0.342      0.468   0.816  	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After	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs	  the	  DoD–1	  mean	  return	  is	  27.7	  %	  with	  p–value	  of	  0.342,	  being	  statistically	  not	  significant.	  When	  the	  market–adjustments	  are	  added	  the	  mean	  returns	  drop	  to	  19.9	  %	  and	  –1.9	  %,	  both	  statistically	  not	  significant.	  	  	  Since	  the	  DoD–1	  annual	  returns	  were	  all	  statistically	  not	  significant,	  the	  results	  of	  monthly	  returns	   for	   the	  portfolio	  are	  presented	  next.	  Additionally,	   it	   is	  examined	  whether	  the	  DoD–1	  can	  outperform	  the	  index	  with	  statistically	  significant	  returns.	  Table	   12	   shows	   the	  monthly	   returns	  of	   the	  DoD–1	  portfolio.	   The	  mean	  monthly	  return	   is	  2.2	  %,	  which	   is	  also	  statistically	  significant	  with	  p–value	  of	  0.024.	  After	  market–adjustments	   the	   mean	   is	   1.8	   %	   and	   1	   %,	   the	   first	   being	   statistically	  significant	  at	  0.1	  level	  and	  the	  second	  at	  0.05	  level.	  When	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs	  are	  implemented,	  the	  returns	  are	  all	  statistically	  not	  significant.	  The	  monthly	  mean	  return	  is	  0.9	  %	  and	  after	  market–adjustments	  0.4	  %	  and	  –0.3	  %.	  	  	  	  
Table	  12.	  Monthly	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio.	  	  
                     DoD–1           S&P  500       𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
Mean   0.022   0.004   0.018   0.010  
t–statistic   2.278   1.495   1.956   3.748  
p–value   0.024   0.136   0.052   0.000  
Median   0.021   0.010   0.008   0.005  
Minimum   –0.399   –0.169   –0.383   –0.115  
Maximum   0.742   0.108   0.648   0.129  
Standard  deviation   0.477   0.143   0.446   0.039  
No.  of  positive  periods   116   127   113   119  
No.  of  observations   204   204   204   204  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   0.009      0.004   –0.003  
t–statistic   0.911      0.492   –1.093  
p–value   0.363      0.624   0.276  	  For	   the	  DoD–1	   the	   same	  risk–adjustments	  are	  used	  as	  with	   the	  DoD–10	  and	   the	  DoD–5.	  The	  risk–adjusted	  return	  is	  measured	  using	  Sharpe	  ratio	  and	  Treynor	  index.	  Table	  13	  illustrates	  the	  DoD–1	  and	  S&P	  500	  Sharpe	  ratios	  and	  Treynor	  indices	  from	  year	  2001	  to	  year	  2017.	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Table	  13.	  Sharpe	  ratios	  and	  Treynor	  indices	  for	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio	  and	  S&P	  500	  index.	  












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Panel	  A	  presents	  that	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio’s	  Sharpe	  ratio	  was	  higher	  than	  the	  index’s	  10	  times	  out	  of	  total	  17,	  totaling	  to	  59	  %.	  The	  Sharpe	  ratio	  ranges	  from	  –1.200	  in	  2015	   to	  2.910	   in	   2001	  with	   an	   average	   of	   0.885.	   Panel	   B	   shows	   that	   the	  DoD–1	  portfolio’s	  Treynor	   index	   changes	   from	  –2.489	   in	  2001	   to	  1.611	   in	  2011	  with	  an	  average	  of	  0.213.	  The	  DoD–1	  had	  higher	  Treynor	  index	  only	  8	  out	  of	  total	  17	  times,	  so	  the	  market	  outperformed	  the	  DoD–1.	  The	  DoD–1	  beta	  changes	   from	  –0.390	   in	  2008	  to	  5.240	  in	  2003	  averaging	  for	  the	  whole	  time	  period	  to	  1.554,	  meaning	  that	  the	  DoD–1	  is	  significantly	  more	  volatile	  than	  the	  market.	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To	  summarize,	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  DoD–1	  portfolio	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  on	  any	   conventional	   level,	   except	  on	  monthly	  returns	  before	   tax	  and	   transaction	  costs,	  thus	  it	  does	  create	  high	  mean	  returns	  on	  annually	  and	  monthly	  basis.	  When	  the	  market–adjustments,	  taxes	  and	  transaction	  costs	  are	  considered,	  the	  returns	  are	  turned	  to	  negative	  or	  only	  slightly	  positive.	  The	  risk–adjustments	  Sharpe	  ratio	  and	  Treynor	  index	  numbers	  shows	  that	  the	  DoD–1	  is	  a	  lot	  more	  volatile	  and	  riskier	  than	  market	  index	  and	  that	  it	  does	  not	  create	  much	  risk–adjusted	  return.	  	  	  	  7.4.	  The	  DoD	  portfolios	  performance	  against	  market	  downturns	  	  	  Gombola	  and	  Lui	  (1993a)	  stated	  that	  high	  dividend	  yield	  had	  positive	  relationship	  with	  the	  stock	  price	  during	  market	  downturns	  and	  Blume	  (1980)	  showed	  that	  high	  dividend	   companies	   outperform	   low	   dividend	   yield	   companies	   during	   market	  downturns.	   Therefore,	   the	   last	   subchapter	   is	   to	   analyze	   how	   the	   different	   DoD	  portfolios	  cope	  against	  market	  downturns.	  	  	  
Table	  14.	  Annual	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  in	  market	  downturns.	  
	  Table	  14	  shows	  the	  annual	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  performance	  against	  the	  S&P	  500	  index’s	  downturns.	  The	  mean	  annual	  return	  for	  the	  market	  index	  during	  market	  downturns	  is	  –23.5	  %,	  while	  the	  mean	  return	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  is	  2.9	  %,	  for	  
     DoD–10   DoD–10   DoD–5   DoD–5   DoD–1   DoD–1  
Year   DoD–10   DoD–5   DoD–1   S&P  500   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
2001   0.414   0.589   0.449   –0.118   0.532   0.868   0.707   1.017   0.567   0.956  
2002   0.163   0.184   0.074   –0.220   0.382   0.581   0.404   0.615   0.294   0.302  
2008   –0.491   –0.400   –0.441   –0.366   –0.125   –0.148   –0.034   –0.083   –0.075   0.043  
Mean   0.029   0.124   0.027   –0.235   0.263   0.434   0.359   0.516   0.262   0.434  
t–statistic   0.151   0.612   0.149   –4.613   1.871   2.028   2.360   2.272   1.992   2.258  
p–value   0.890   0.584   0.891   0.019   0.158   0.136   0.099   0.108   0.140   0.109  
Median   0.163   0.184   0.074   –0.220   0.382   0.581   0.404   0.615   0.294   0.302  
Minimum   –0.491   –0.400   –0.441   –0.366   –0.125   –0.148   –0.034   –0.083   –0.075   0.043  
Maximum   0.414   0.589   0.449   –0.118   0.532   0.868   0.707   1.017   0.567   0.956  
Standard  deviation   0.381   0.406   0.365   0.101   0.281   0.428   0.304   0.455   0.263   0.385  
No.  of  positive  periods   2   2   2   0   2   2   2   2   2   2  
No.  of  observations   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   –0.019   0.044   –0.130      0.215   0.386   0.279   0.436   0.104   0.276  
t–statistic   –0.072   0.153   –0.506      1.082   1.275   1.294   1.355   0.560   1.015  
p–value   0.949   0.892   0.663      0.392   0.330   0.325   0.308   0.632   0.417  
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the	  DoD–5	  is	  12.4	  %	  and	  for	  the	  DoD–1	  is	  2.7	  %.	  It	  can	  be	  noted	  from	  the	  Table	  14	  that	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  were	  negative	  only	  one	  year	  during	  the	  market	  downturns.	  After	   the	   market–adjustments	   the	   returns	   are	   still	   highly	   positive.	   Statistically	  speaking,	  only	  the	  index’s	  mean	  return	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level	  and	  the	  DoD–5	  market–adjusted	  mean	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	  level.	  After	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs,	  the	  mean	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  still	  outperform	  the	  index’s	  mean	  return.	  Thus,	  none	  of	  the	  returns	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  DoD–5	  performs	  best	  in	  the	  market	  downturns	  with	  0.4	  %	  return	  after	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs,	  and	  after	  the	  market–adjustments	  the	  mean	  returns	  are	  27.9	  %	  and	  43.6	  %	  respectively.	  Due	  to	  the	  extremely	  small	  number	  of	  annual	  observations,	  these	   results	   should	   again	   be	   analyzed	   with	   caution.	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   more	  observations,	  the	  monthly	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  against	  market	  downturns	  are	  presented	  next.	  	  Table	   15	   introduces	   the	  monthly	  mean	   returns	   of	   the	   DoD	   portfolios	   in	  market	  downturns.	  The	  mean	  return	  for	  the	  DoD–10	  is	  5.1	  %,	  the	  DoD–5	  is	  6.6	  %	  and	  the	  DoD–1	  is	  7.6	  %,	  compared	  to	  the	  index	  mean	  return	  of	  –0.3	  %.	  All	  of	  the	  DoD	  returns	  are	   statistically	   significant	  at	   the	  0.05	   level,	  whereas	   the	   index	   is	  not	   statistically	  significant	  at	  any	  conventional	  level.	  Median	  for	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  are	  on	  average	  3.8	  %	   compared	   to	   index’s	   significantly	   lower	   0.3	  %.	   The	  DoD	  portfolios	  has	   on	  average	  76	  %	  positive	  months	  against	  the	  index’s	  53	  %.	  	  	  	  
Table	  15.	  Monthly	  returns	  of	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	  in	  market	  downturns.	  	  
	  
     DoD–10   DoD–10   DoD–5   DoD–5   DoD–1   DoD–1  
Year   DoD–10   DoD–5   DoD–1   S&P  500   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝐀   𝐀𝐑𝐌𝟐  
Mean   0.051   0.066   0.076   –0.003   0.053   0.038   0.069   0.036   0.078   0.031  
t–statistic   3.068   3.426   2.574   –0.287   3.910   3.094   4.150   3.181   2.881   2.974  
p–value   0.004   0.002   0.014   0.776   0.000   0.004   0.000   0.003   0.007   0.005  
Median   0.035   0.047   0.031   0.003   0.052   0.033   0.073   0.027   0.041   0.030  
Minimum   –0.135   –0.075   –0.150   –0.110   –0.131   –0.176   –0.122   –0.170   –0.236   –0.115  
Maximum   0.486   0.552   0.742   0.094   0.392   0.165   0.458   0.161   0.648   0.129  
Standard  deviation   0.097   0.114   0.173   0.060   0.081   0.072   0.098   0.066   0.161   0.062  
No.  of  positive  periods   28   27   27   19   28   27   29   26   26   23  
No.  of  observations   36   36   36   36   36   36   36   36   36   36  
Tax  and  transaction  cost  adjusted  return   0.046   0.059   0.062      0.049   0.034   0.062   0.029   0.065   0.018  
t–statistic   2.813   3.081   2.123      3.612   2.764   3.741   2.582   2.394   1.723  
p–value   0.008   0.004   0.041      0.001   0.009   0.001   0.014   0.022   0.094  
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8.	  SUMMARY	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	   this	   study	   is	   to	   investigate	  whether	   the	  DoD	  strategies	   can	  outperform	  the	  S&P	  500	  index	  over	  the	  time	  period	  from	  2001	  to	  2017	  and	  how	  the	  DoD	   strategies	   copes	   against	   market	   downturns.	   To	   be	   more	   precise,	   the	   DoD	  strategies	  involve;	  the	  DoD–10	  where	  the	  top	  10	  highest	  dividend	  yield	  companies	  from	  the	  S&P	  500	  are	  picked	  and	  the	  equally	  balanced	  portfolio	  is	  held	  for	  one	  year,	  the	  DoD–5,	  where	  from	  the	  DoD–10	  portfolio	  the	  five	  cheapest	  stocks	  are	  chosen	  and	  held	  for	  one	  year	  and	  the	  DoD–1,	  where	  from	  the	  DoD–5	  portfolio	  the	  second	  least	  expensive	  stock	  is	  chosen	  and	  held	  for	  one	  year.	  	  	  The	   first	  hypothesis	  of	   this	  study	   is	   that	   “The	  DoD	  portfolios’	   returns	  exceed	   the	  market	  return	  on	  both	  risk–adjusted	  and	  absolute	  bases”.	  The	  annual	  mean	  returns	  of	   the	   DoD	   portfolios	   all	   outperform	   the	   index.	   The	   DoD–10	   is	   also	   statistically	  significant,	  while	  the	  other	  portfolios	  are	  not.	  On	  monthly	  basis,	  all	  portfolios	  also	  outperform	  the	  market	  returns,	  and	  all	  except	  the	  DoD–1	  market–adjusted	  return	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  When	  the	  risk–adjustments	  are	  taken	  into	  account,	  the	  DoD	  portfolios	   still	   outperform	   the	  market.	   Only	   the	  DoD–1	  Treynor	   indices	   are	  weaker	   than	   the	   market’s.	   When	   considering	   all	   the	   empirical	   results,	   the	   first	  hypothesis	  must	  be	  accepted.	  	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  states	  “The	  DoD	  portfolios’	  returns	  exceed	  the	  market	  return	  after	   transaction	   costs	   and	   tax–adjustments”.	   When	   considering	   the	   tax	   and	  transaction	  costs,	  the	  DoD–10	  annual	  mean	  return	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.1	   level,	   but	   after	   market–adjustments	   statistically	   not	   significant.	   On	   monthly	  basis,	   the	  mean	   results	   for	   the	  DoD–10	  are	  all	   statistically	  significant	  at	   the	  0.05	  level,	  thus	  outperforming	  the	  index.	  After	  the	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs,	  returns	  for	  DoD–5	  are	  still	  higher	  than	  the	  market’s,	  but	  none	  are	  statistical	  significant.	  Monthly	  returns	  are	  all	  higher	  than	  the	  market’s	  return,	  and	  the	  monthly	  mean	  return	  before	  the	  market–adjustments	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  Since	  the	  DoD–1	  has	  rather	  high	  tax	  and	  transaction	  costs	  due	  to	  high	  turnover	  rate,	  the	  returns	  are	  affected	  the	  most.	  The	  DoD–1’sx	  annual	  and	  monthly	  returns	  are	  all	  statistically	  not	  significant,	   and	   after	   ‘Modigliani–squared’–adjustment,	   even	   creates	   negative	  return.	   Since	   the	   DoD–10	   had	   statistically	   significant	   returns	   on	   monthly	   basis	  compared	  to	  the	  DoD–5,	  which	  had	  them	  only	  before	  market–adjustments,	  and	  as	  all	   the	   other	   observations	  were	   not	   significant,	   the	   second	   hypothesis	   has	   to	   be	  rejected.	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